TO MYSELF

BORN FOR EACH OTHER

κοινωνία

We were made for one another.

MARCUS AURELIUS

ΤΩΝ ΕΙΣ ΕΑΥΤΟΝ · BOOK XI

CLASSIC MOTIVATION

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MARCUS AURELIUS ANTONINUS

Book XI of To Myself

Greek Original · Latin (Xylander, 1558)
English from the Greek · English from the Latin

CLASSIC MOTIVATION

To Myself — Book XI: Born for Each Other

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This volume presents Book XI of the Meditations of Marcus Aurelius in four parallel columns: the Greek original, the Latin translation of Wilhelm Xylander (1558), a modern English rendering from the Greek, and a modern English rendering from the Latin — followed by notes on the language and commentary.

A note on the text.

The Greek and the English-from-Greek follow the standard critical text of the Meditations. The Latin column reproduces Xylander's 1558 translation; where the early text was incomplete, a small number of passages are editorial restorations supplied for continuity and are identified in the project's reconstruction record. They are not presented as verbatim sixteenth-century readings.

This Volume

Book XI turns Marcus's Stoicism outward, toward other people. It begins with a portrait of the rational soul — able to see itself, shape itself, reach its own goal, and survey the whole ordered cosmos — and it ends with a set of plain, almost tactical reminders for the hardest part of that life: living alongside people who are ungrateful, offensive, or unjust.

The book's premise is that we are not solitary. Reason is common; law is common; the world is a single city, and human beings are its fellow-citizens, made — like feet, hands, eyelids, the rows of upper and lower teeth — to work together. To turn against one another is unnatural; and to resent a person for being what he is, is to demand that figs not yield juice.

The Greek keyword of this book is κοινωνία — fellowship, community, the bond that makes us one.

Introduction to Book XI

Book XI opens with an inventory of the rational soul's powers. It sees itself, analyzes itself, shapes itself into whatever it wishes, gathers the fruit it bears (where plants and animals leave their fruit for others), and — whenever life reaches its term — attains its own end, so that its story is complete at any point and never a broken-off fragment. It ranges over the whole ordered universe and the empty space around it, reaches into the boundlessness of time, and comprehends the periodic rebirth of all things. And, most to the book's purpose, it loves its neighbors, and holds to truth and to reverence.

From that height the book descends to daily friction. Marcus knows that the rational, social life is tested not in contemplation but in the company of difficult people, and much of Book XI is a practical handbook for exactly that. When you are about to be offended by someone's shamelessness, ask at once whether it is possible for there to be no shameless people in the world — it is not; so stop demanding the impossible. Remember that you cannot truly be harmed by another's fault, and that the two of you were born to work together, like the upper and lower rows of teeth. Remember that the wrongdoer harms himself more than you. Anger and grief, he insists again and again, hurt us more than the things that provoke them.

The most famous passage gathers these lessons into a list — the ten gifts Marcus says come "from Apollo and the Muses": that men were made for one another; that we should consider what a person's character forces him to be; that if he acts rightly there is no cause for complaint and if wrongly he does it unwillingly, in ignorance; that none of us is faultless; that we can never be sure another has truly done wrong; that human life is brief and soon we are all dead; that it is our own judgments, not other people's deeds, that trouble us; that anger and rage cost us more than the offense; that kindness is invincible when it is sincere; and that to expect a bad man not to do wrong is madness.

Read the columns together. Watch how Xylander's Latin handles Marcus's civic vocabulary — the common reason, the common law, the world as a single city — and how the two English renderings carry the book's insistent, hard-won conclusion: that we are, by our very nature, born for each other. A few Latin passages in this book are editorial restorations, noted on the imprint page.

Book XI · Born for Each Other

Book XI · Section 1

The Rational Soul

Greek Original	Latin (Xylander 1558)
Τὰ ἴδια τῆς λογικῆς ψυχῆς˙ ἑαυτὴν ὁρᾷ, ἑαυτὴν διαρθροῖ,ἑαυτὴν ὁποίαν ἂν βούληται ποιεῖ, τὸν καρπὸν ὃν φέρει αὐτὴκαρποῦται (τοὺς γὰρ τῶν φυτῶν καρποὺς καὶ τὸ ἀνάλογον ἐπὶτῶν ζῴων ἄλλοι καρποῦνται), τοῦ ἰδίου τέλους τυγχάνει, ὅπουἂν τὸ τοῦ βίου πέρας ἐπιστῇ, οὐχ ὥσπερ ἐπὶ ὀρχήσεως καὶὑποκρίσεως καὶ τῶν τοιούτων ἀτελὴς γίνεται ἡ ὅλη πρᾶξις, ἐάντι ἐγκόψῃ, ἀλλ ἐπὶ παντὸς μέρους καὶ ὅπου ἂν καταληφθῇ, πλῆρεςκαὶ ἀπροσδεὲς ἑαυτῇ τὸ προτεθὲν ποιεῖ, ὥστε εἰπεῖν˙ ἐγὼ ἀπέχωτὰ ἐμά. ἔτι δὲ περιέρχεται τὸν ὅλον κόσμον καὶ τὸ περὶ αὐτὸνκενὸν καὶ τὸ σχῆμα αὐτοῦ καὶ εἰς τὴν ἀπειρίαν τοῦ αἰῶνοςἐκτείνεται καὶ τὴν περιοδικὴν παλιγγενεσίαν τῶν ὅλων ἐμπεριλαμβάνειεκαὶ περινοεῖ καὶ θεωρεῖ ὅτι οὐδὲν νεώτερον ὄψονταιοἱ μεθ ἡμᾶς οὐδὲ περιττότερον εἶδον οἱ πρὸ ἡμῶν, ἀλλὰ τρόποντινὰ ὁ τεσσαρακοντούτης, ἐὰν νοῦν ὁποσονοῦν ἔχῃ, πάντα τὰγεγονότα καὶ τὰ ἐσόμενα ἑώρακε κατὰ τὸ ὁμοειδές. ἴδιον δὲλογικῆς ψυχῆς καὶ τὸ φιλεῖν τοὺς πλησίον καὶ ἀλήθεια καὶ αἰδὼςκαὶ τὸ μηδὲν ἑαυτῆς προτιμᾶν, ὅπερ ἴδιον καὶ νόμου˙ οὕτως ἄρουδὲν διήνεγκε λόγος ὀρθὸς καὶ λόγος δικαιοσύνης	*Haec propria sunt animi ratione praediti: seipsum videt, seipsum componit, seipsum talem qualem vult efficit, fructus quos fert ipse percipit (etenim plantarum fructus, atque etiam animalium, alii percipiunt), suum finem consequitur quicumque vitae sit terminus: non ut in saltatione & agendis fabulis aliisque id genus rebus fit, ut si quid offendatur tota actio fiat irrita; sed is animus omni in parte, ubicumque deprehendatur, id quod oblatum est perfectum & nullius rei indiguum reddit, atque ita dicere possit se suum habere. Complectitur praeterea totum mundum, eique inane circumdatum, figuram eius, infinitatem aevi, certis conversionibus constantem regenerationem universarum rerum contemplatur. Inde cognoscit neque novum aliquid posteris eventurum, neque eos qui ante nos fuere quicquam amplius nobis vidisse: sed quod is qui quadraginta annorum est, si mente utatur, fere omnia praeterita & futura videt in rebus eiusdem formae.*
English from Greek: The properties of the rational soul: it sees itself, articulates itself, makes itself such as it wills, reaps	English from Latin: These are the proper attributes of a mind endowed with reason: it sees itself, it orders itself, it makes itself

itself the fruit it bears — whereas the fruits of plants, and what corresponds to fruit in animals, others reap. It attains its own end wherever the limit of life is set; not like a dance or a play and such things, where the whole performance is incomplete if anything cuts it short — rather, in every part, and wherever it is overtaken, it makes what it proposed complete and entire for itself, so that it can say: I have what is mine. Further, it ranges over the whole cosmos and the void around it, and traces its shape; it stretches into the infinity of time; it embraces and comprehends the periodic rebirth of all things; and it perceives that those after us will see nothing newer, just as those before us saw nothing more — so that, in a way, the man of forty, if he has any understanding at all, has seen everything that has been and will be, by reason of its uniformity. And a property of the rational soul is also love of neighbor, and truth, and self-respect, and to honor nothing above itself — which is also the property of law. So there is no difference between right reason and the reason of justice.	such as it wishes, it reaps itself the fruits it bears (for others reap the fruits of plants, and also of animals), it attains its own end whatever the limit of life may be: not as occurs in a dance and in acting plays and other things of that kind, where if an obstacle is encountered the whole performance is made void; but this mind in every part, wherever it may be overtaken, renders that which has been presented perfect and in need of nothing, and thus it can say that it holds its own. Furthermore, it embraces the whole world, and the void surrounding it, its shape, the infinity of time, and contemplates the constant regeneration of all things by fixed revolutions. From this it recognizes that nothing new will happen to posterity, nor have those who were before us seen anything more than we: but that he who is forty years old, if he uses his mind, sees almost all things past and future in things of the same form. Scholarly Note: Xylander's division truncates the final sentence of the standard Greek text here, transferring the properties of neighborly love, truth, and justice to the beginning of Section 2.

Language Differences: *Xylander's manuscript tradition truncates the final line of the standard Greek chapter block (ἴδιον δὲ λογικῆς ψυχῆς...), moving Marcus's criteria regarding communal love, truth, and basic self-respect over to serve as the structural preface for Section 2.*

Commentary: Marcus catalogs the unassailable baseline mechanics of the rational soul. Unlike artistic performances (such as a choreographed dance or a play) that are rendered broken or incomplete if halted mid-movement, a well-ordered mind functions as a structurally complete whole (πλῆρες καὶ ἀπροσδεὲς) at any given second.

Book XI · Section 2

Reduction of Pleasure

Greek Original	Latin (Xylander 1558)
Ὡιδῆς ἐπιτερποῦς καὶ ὀρχήσεως καὶ παγκρατίου καταφρονήσεις,ἐὰν τὴν μὲν ἐμμελῆ φωνὴν καταμερίσῃς εἰς ἕκαστον τῶνφθόγγων καὶ καθ ἕνα πύθῃ σεαυτοῦ,	*Haec quoque ei sunt propria: amor proximi, veritas, verecundia, ut nihil seipsa praestantius ducat — quod quidem et cum Lege est commune, ita ut*

εἰ τούτου ἥττων εἶ˙διατραπήσῃ γάρ˙ ἐπὶ δὲ ὀρχήσεως τὸ ἀνάλογον ποιήσας καθἑκάστην κίνησιν ἢ σχέσιν, τὸ δ αὐτὸ καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ παγκρατίου.ὅλως οὖν, χωρὶς ἀρετῆς καὶ τῶν ἀπ ἀρετῆς, μέμνησο ἐπὶ τὰ κατὰμέρος τρέχειν καὶ τῇ διαιρέσει αὐτῶν εἰς καταφρόνησιν ἰέναι,τὸ δ αὐτὸ καὶ ἐπὶ τὸν βίον ὅλον μεταφέρειν	*nihil intersit inter rectam rationem & rationem iustitiae. Cantilenam iucundam, saltationem, & pancratium contemnes, si vocem suave sonantem dividas in singulos sonos, atque seorsim de singulis ex teipso quaeras an ab eo patiare te vinci: pudore profecto afficieris. Idem de reliquis suo modo intellige. Denique in rebus illis quae non sunt virtus nec a virtute proficiscuntur, memento ad partes eorum respicere, divisioneque illa in contemptum adducere: idque in usum totius vitae est transferendum.*
English from Greek: You will despise charming song and dance and the pancration, if you cut the melodic line into its single notes and ask yourself, at each one: is this what masters me? You will shrink from owning it. With dance do the like for each movement and pose, and the same with the pancration. In sum: virtue and what flows from virtue aside, remember to run to the parts of things, and by dividing them come to despise them — and carry the same method over to the whole of life.	English from Latin: These also are its proper attributes: love of neighbor, truth, modesty, so that it considers nothing more excellent than itself—which indeed is also common to the Law, so that there is no difference between right reason and the reason of justice. You will despise a delightful song, dance, and the pancration, if you divide the sweet-sounding voice into individual notes, and ask yourself separately concerning each one whether you would allow yourself to be overcome by it: you will surely be filled with shame. Understand the same concerning the remaining things in their own way. Finally, in those things which are not virtue nor proceed from virtue, remember to look to their parts, and by that division bring them into contempt: and this method must be transferred into the practice of the whole of life. Scholarly Note: "Verecundia" translates the Greek αἰδώς (self-respect/shame). The structural shift at the opening reflects the layout of early printed Greek manuscripts accessible in the 16th century.

Language Differences: *Xylander appends the moral coordinates of Section 1 directly here. He translates Marcus's specialized philosophical noun αἰδώς (moral self-respect or proper shame) as verecundia.*

Commentary: Marcus reinforces his prime analytical toolkit for short-circuiting sensory infatuation. To avoid being overwhelmed by an artistic performance or external pleasure, slice it down to its granular elements. A complex melody reduces to single notes, and an athletic contest reduces to isolated positions, stripping away their illusory grandeur.

Book XI · Section 3

Rational Departure

Greek Original	Latin (Xylander 1558)
Οἵα ἐστὶν ἡ ψυχὴ ἡ ἕτοιμος, ἐὰν ἤδη ἀπολυθῆναι δέῃ τοῦσώματος, [καὶ] ἤτοι σβεσθῆναι ἢ σκεδασθῆναι ἢ συμμεῖναι. τὸδὲ ἕτοιμον τοῦτο ἵνα ἀπὸ ἰδικῆς κρίσεως ἔρχηται, μὴ κατὰ ψιλὴνπαράταξιν ὡς οἱ Χριστιανοί, ἀλλὰ λελογισμένως καὶ σεμνῶς καὶὥστε καὶ ἄλλον πεῖσαι, ἀτραγῴδως	*Qualis est anima quae parata sit, si iam debeat a corpore solvi, & vel extingui vel dissipari vel constare. Ut autem sic parata sit, a peculiari iudicio venit: non ut simpliciter mortem aliquis subeat, id quod Christiani faciunt, sed bene subductis rationibus & cum gravitate, ita ut & alteri hoc sine verborum exaggeratione persuadere possis.*
English from Greek: What a soul it is that stands ready, if it must this moment be released from the body — whether to be extinguished, or scattered, or to persist. But let this readiness come from its own judgment, not from bare opposition like the Christians; let it come considered, dignified, and — so as to persuade another — without theatrics.	English from Latin: What a soul it is that stands ready, if it must already be released from the body, either to be extinguished or scattered or to persist. But that it may be so prepared, this comes from a specific judgment: not that someone should undergo death out of sheer obstinacy, which is what the Christians do, but with well-calculated reasons and with dignity, so that you can also persuade another of this without exaggeration of words. Scholarly Note: "Non ut simpliciter mortem aliquis subeat" represents a slight interpretative compromise by Xylander for the Greek ψιλὴν παράταξιν ("bare opposition/obstinacy"), rendering it as dying "simpliciter" (purely/merely), though his overall contrast with Christian martyrdom remains structurally precise.

Language Differences: *Xylander interprets the phrase μὴ κατὰ ψιλὴν παράταξιν (not out of pure tactical / military alignment or unreflective obstinacy) as non ut simpliciter mortem aliquis subeat ("not that someone should merely undergo death").*

Commentary: This text marks Marcus's only direct reference to the Christians. A Stoic readiness for death must be born entirely out of individual, calculated analysis (λελογισμένως). Marcus critiques Christian martyrology because he perceives it as an act of non-rational, dramatic alignment (παράταξιν), whereas a true philosopher exits the stage without operatic posturing (ἀτραγῴδως).

Book XI · Section 4

The Benefit of Social Action

Greek Original	Latin (Xylander 1558)
Πεποίηκά τι κοινωνικῶς; οὐκοῦν ὠφέλημαι. τοῦτο ἵνα ἀεὶπρόχειρον ἀπαντᾷ καὶ μηδαμοῦ παύου	*Egi aliquid ad societatem humanam conducens: ergo utilitatem sum consecutus. Id semper occurrat, nequaquam desit.*
English from Greek: Have I done something social? Then I have been benefited. Let this meet you always, ready at hand — and nowhere cease.	English from Latin: I have done something conducive to human society: therefore I have attained a benefit. Let this always occur to you, let it by no means be lacking.

Language Differences: *The Greek adverb κοινωνικῶς (for the common benefit) is expanded by Xylander into the classic civic phrase ad societatem humanam conducens.*

Commentary: Because humans are individual limbs of a single rational community, serving another person is a direct investment in your own moral character, functioning as an internal reward rather than an external trade.

Book XI · Section 5

The Art of Being Good

Greek Original	Latin (Xylander 1558)
Τίς σου ἡ τέχνη; ἀγαθὸν εἶναι. τοῦτο δὲ πῶς ἄλλως γίνεται ἢἐκ θεωρημάτων, τῶν μὲν περὶ τῆς τοῦ ὅλου φύσεως, τῶν δὲ περὶτῆς ἰδίας τοῦ ἀνθρώπου κατασκευῆς	*Quae tibi est ars? Bonum esse. Quanam autem hoc fit ratione, nisi si contempleris, partim naturam universi, partim hominis structuram?*
English from Greek: What is your art? To be good. And how is this achieved except by contemplations — some concerning the nature of the whole, others concerning the proper constitution of man?	English from Latin: What is your art? To be good. And by what means is this achieved, unless you contemplate, in part, the nature of the universe, and in part, the structure of man?

Language Differences: *Marcus uses κατασκευῆς (constitutional architecture). Xylander renders this exactly using the standard anatomical noun structuram.*

Commentary: Living is treated as an active craft (τέχνη) with its own operational rules. Fulfilling this trade requires continuous contemplation of two fields: cosmic physics and human design.

Book XI · Section 6

The Purpose of Tragedy and Comedy

Greek Original	Latin (Xylander 1558)
Πρῶτον αἱ τραγῳδίαι παρήχθησαν ὑπομνηστικαὶ τῶν συμβαινόντωνκαὶ ὅτι ταῦτα οὕτως πέφυκε γίνεσθαι καὶ ὅτι, οἷς ἐπὶτῆς σκηνῆς ψυχαγωγεῖσθε, τούτοις μὴ ἄχθεσθε ἐπὶ τῆς μείζονοςσκηνῆς˙ ὁρᾶτε γὰρ ὅτι οὕτως δεῖ ταῦτα περαίνεσθαι καὶ ὅτιφέρουσιν αὐτὰ καὶ οἱ κεκραγότες˙ “ἰὼ Κιθαιρών.” καὶ λέγεται δέτινα ὑπὸ τῶν τὰ δράματα ποιούντων χρησίμως˙ οἷόν ἐστιν ἐκεῖνομάλιστα˙ εἰ δ ἠμελήθην ἐκ θεῶν καὶ παῖδ ἐμώ, ἔχει λόγον καὶτοῦτο˙ καὶ πάλιν˙ τοῖς πράγμασιν γὰρ οὐχὶ θυμοῦσθαι ‹χρεών›.καί˙ βίον θερίζειν ὥστε κάρπιμον στάχυν˙ καὶ ὅσα τοιαῦτα. μετὰδὲ τὴν τραγῳδίαν ἡ ἀρχαία κωμῳδία παρήχθη, παιδαγωγικὴνπαῤῥησίαν ἔχουσα καὶ τῆς ἀτυφίας οὐκ ἀχρήστως δἰ αὐτῆς τῆςεὐθυῤῥημοσύνης ὑπομιμνήσκουσα˙ πρὸς οἷόν τι καὶ Διογένηςταυτὶ παρελάμβανεν. μετὰ ταῦτα τίς ἡ μέση κωμῳδία καὶ λοιπὸνἡ νέα πρὸς τί ποτε παρείληπται, ἢ κατ ὀλίγον ἐπὶ τὴν ἐκ μιμήσεωςφιλοτεχνίαν ὑπερῥύη, ἐπίστησον. ὅτι μὲν γὰρ λέγεται καὶ ὑπὸτούτων τινὰ χρήσιμα οὐκ ἀγνοεῖται, ἀλλὰ ἡ ὅλη ἐπιβολὴ τῆςτοιαύτης ποιήσεως καὶ δραματουργίας πρὸς τίνα ποτὲ σκοπὸνἀπέβλεψεν	*Initio Tragoediae prolatae sunt, quae monerent de iis quae accidere hominibus solent, eam esse rerum naturam ut sic eveniant. At vero quibus in scena delectabamini, cur iisdem offendimini in maiore vitae humanae theatro? Videris quidem quod ita haec debuerint perfici, quod ea ferunt etiam ii qui exclamaverunt 'Io Cithaeron.' Et sane quaedam utiliter a poetis dicuntur, quale est illud in primis: 'Quod si dii me negligunt & liberos, rationem habet illud.' Item: 'Nam rebus irasci sane nihil expedit.' Et: 'Frugiferam ut spicam meae vitae metam,' aliaque id genus. Post Tragoediam vetus Comoedia illata est, libertatem disciplinae accommodatam habens, eaque ipsa haud inutiliter nos monens ne fastu extolleremur. Cuius simile aliquid etiam Diogenes usurpavit. Post has & media quaedam comoedia & ad extrema nova assumptae sunt, haud alium ob finem quam ad studium artis imitando ostentandae. Dici enim & ab his ipsis quaedam utilia non ignoratur: sed tota huius poeseos & fabularum scriptionis intentio quemnam finem respicit?*
English from Greek: First tragedies were brought on, reminders of what happens — that these things naturally come to pass so, and that what charms you on the stage should not weigh on you on the greater stage. For you see that these things must be carried through thus, and that even those who cry 'O Cithaeron!' bear them. And some things are said usefully by the makers of drama; above all, for instance: 'If I and my two sons are neglected by the gods, this too has its reason'; and again: 'It avails not to be angry at events'; and: 'Reap life like a fruitful ear of grain'; and the like. After tragedy the Old Comedy was brought on, with a schoolmaster's freedom of speech, usefully reminding men of plainness by its very bluntness — to which	English from Latin: In the beginning, Tragedies were brought forth to advise concerning those things which are accustomed to happen to human beings, and that it is the nature of things that they turn out thus. But indeed, why are you offended in the greater theater of human life by those very things which delighted you on the stage? You see indeed that these things had to be fulfilled in this way, and that even those who cried out 'O Cithaeron!' bear them. And truly, some things are usefully spoken by poets, such as this in particular: 'But if the gods neglect me and my children, that too has its reason.' Likewise: 'For to be angry at events is surely of no use.' And: 'May I reap my life like a fruitful ear of grain,' and

end Diogenes too took up something of the kind. After this, consider what the Middle Comedy was, and finally for what purpose the New was adopted, which little by little slid down into mere artistry of imitation. That useful things are said even by these is not unknown; but what aim did the whole enterprise of such poetry and drama-making have in view?	other things of that kind. After Tragedy, the Old Comedy was introduced, possessing a freedom adapted to discipline, and itself reminding us usefully not to be puffed up with pride. Diogenes also adopted something similar to this. After these, both a certain Middle Comedy and finally the New were adopted, for no other purpose than to display the study of art through imitation. For it is not unknown that some useful things are said even by these themselves: but what end does the whole purpose of such poetry and play-writing look toward?

Language Differences: *Marcus's macro-theatrical setting ἐπὶ τῆς μείζονος σκηνῆς (on the grander stage of physical existence) is translated as in maiore vitae humanae theatro ("in the grander theater of human life"). The crucial noun παῤῥησίαν (frank, blunt, unvarnished speech) is translated loosely as libertatem.*

Commentary: Theatre functions as a diagnostic tool for character. Ancient Tragedy prepares the observer to accept real crises on the world stage, while Old Comedy deploys blunt speech (παῤῥησία) to deflate individual vanity. Marcus dismisses later comedic formats as mere technical decoration devoid of moral utility.

Book XI · Section 7

The Best Life for Philosophy

Greek Original	Latin (Xylander 1558)
Πῶς ἐναργὲς προσπίπτει τὸ μὴ εἶναι ἄλλην βίου ὑπόθεσιν εἰςτὸ φιλοσοφεῖν οὕτως ἐπιτήδειον ὡς ταύτην, ἐν ᾗ νῦν ὢν τυγχάνεις	*Quomodo evidens fit, non esse aliud vitae propositum ita commodum ad philosophandum, ut est id quod nunc tenes.*
English from Greek: How vividly it strikes one that there is no station in life so well suited to the practice of philosophy as this one in which you now find yourself!	English from Latin: How evident it becomes that there is no other purpose of life so suitable for practicing philosophy as that which you now hold.

Language Differences: *The noun ὑπόθεσιν (foundational scenario / framework) maps directly to Xylander's choice of propositum.*

Commentary: Marcus addresses his own internal complaints regarding court life. There is no ideal, quiet retirement scenario required to practice philosophy;

your immediate imperial difficulties function as the absolute best material to live out virtue.

Book XI · Section 8

The Severed Branch

Greek Original	Latin (Xylander 1558)
Κλάδος τοῦ προσεχοῦς κλάδου ἀποκοπεὶς οὐ δύναται μὴ καὶτοῦ ὅλου φυτοῦ ἀποκεκόφθαι. οὕτω δὴ καὶ ἄνθρωπος ἑνὸςἀνθρώπου ἀποσχισθεὶς ὅλης τῆς κοινωνίας ἀποπέπτωκεν. κλάδονμὲν οὖν ἄλλος ἀποκόπτει˙ ἄνθρωπος δὲ αὐτὸς ἑαυτὸν τοῦ πλησίονχωρίζει μισήσας καὶ ἀποστραφείς, ἀγνοεῖ δὲ ὅτι καὶ τοῦ ὅλουπολιτεύματος ἅμα ἀποτέτμηκεν ἑαυτόν. πλὴν ἐκεῖνό γε δῶροντοῦ συστησαμένου τὴν κοινωνίαν Διός˙ ἔξεστι γὰρ ἡμῖν πάλινσυμφῦναι τῷ προσεχεῖ καὶ πάλιν τοῦ ὅλου συμπληρωτικοῖςγενέσθαι. πλεονάκις μέντοι γινόμενον τὸ κατὰ τὴν τοιαύτηνδιαίρεσιν δυσένωτον καὶ δυσαποκατάστατον ‹τὸ› ἀποχωροῦνποιεῖ. ὅλως τε οὐχ ὅμοιος ὁ κλάδος ὁ ἀπ ἀρχῆς συμβλαστήσαςκαὶ σύμπνους συμμείνας τῷ μετὰ τὴν ἀποκοπὴν αὖθις ἐγκεντρισθέντι,ὅ τι ποτὲ λέγουσιν οἱ φυτουργοί. Ὁμοθαμνεῖν μέν, μὴὁμοδογματεῖν δέ	*Ramus a proximo amputari ramo non potest, quin & a tota arbore resecetur: sic homo etiam ab uno avulsus homine, non potest non a toto excidisse coetu. Itaque ramum quidem alius aliquis amputat; homo seipsum a proximo separat cum eum odit aut aversatur — ignorat vero etiam a tota civili societate se eadem ratione abrumpi. Verumtamen hoc habemus munere Iovis qui hanc societatem constituit, ut rursum adcrescere proximo & explere totum possimus. Et tamen si haec avulsio saepius admittatur, efficit ut uniri iterum atque coalescere haud facile possit id quod erat avulsum: tum vero, quod fatentur plantatores, non eadem est ratio rami qui ab initio floruit cum arbore mansitque in ea, & eius qui amputatus rursus deinde est insitus.*
English from Greek: A branch cut off from its neighboring branch cannot but be cut off from the whole tree. So too a man, severed from one single man, has fallen away from the whole community. Now a branch is cut off by another; but a man separates himself from his neighbor — by hating him, by turning away — and does not know that he has at the same time cut himself off from the whole commonwealth. Except that there is this gift of Zeus, who constituted the community: it is open to us to grow back to our neighbor, and again to become completing parts of the whole. Yet when such separation happens often, it makes the part that withdraws hard to unite and hard to restore. In general, the branch that sprouted with the tree and	English from Latin: A branch cannot be cut off from its neighboring branch without also being severed from the whole tree: so a man torn away even from one single man cannot but have fallen away from the entire community. And so, while someone else cuts off a branch, a man separates himself from his neighbor when he hates or turns away from him—yet he is ignorant that he is broken off from the whole civil society by the same means. Nevertheless, we have this by the gift of Jupiter, who established this society, that we can grow back again to our neighbor and complete the whole. And yet, if this tearing away is allowed too often, it causes that which had been torn away to be unable to reunite and coalesce easily; then indeed, as the

breathed with it to the end is not like the one grafted in again after the cutting — whatever the gardeners say. Grow on the same trunk — but do not hold the same doctrines.	planters admit, the condition of a branch that flourished from the beginning with the tree and remained in it is not the same as that of one which was cut off and then grafted back in again.

Language Differences: *Marcus's civic noun πολιτεύματος (commonwealth / state) is parsed by Xylander as civili societate. He translates the providential name Διός exactly as Iovis.*

Commentary: An expressive botanical metaphor for social alienation. While an external blade cuts a branch away from its trunk, a human being cuts themselves off from humanity through intentional hatred or social aversion. Yet, Zeus has granted us an evolutionary gift: we can choose to graft ourselves back into the common tree via reconciliation.

Book XI · Section 9

Unmoved Kindness

Greek Original	Latin (Xylander 1558)
Οἱ ἐνιστάμενοι προιόντι σοι κατὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον ὥσπερ ἀπὸτῆς ὑγιοῦς πράξεως ἀποτρέψαι σε οὐ δυνήσονται, οὕτως μηδὲτῆς πρὸς αὐτοὺς εὐμενείας ἐκκρουέτωσαν, ἀλλὰ φύλασσε σεαυτὸνέπ ἀμφοτέρων ὁμοίως, μὴ μόνον ἐπὶ τῆς εὐσταθοῦς κρίσεως καὶπράξεως, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς πρὸς τοὺς κωλύειν ἐπιχειροῦντας ἢἄλλως δυσχεραίνοντας πρᾳότητος. καὶ γὰρ τοῦτο ἀσθενές, τὸχαλεπαίνειν αὐτοῖς, ὥσπερ τὸ ἀποστῆναι τῆς πράξεως καὶἐνδοῦναι καταπλαγέντα˙ ἀμφότεροι γὰρ ἐπίσης λιποτάκται, ὁ μὲνὑποτρέσας, ὁ δὲ ἀλλοτριωθεὶς πρὸς τὸν φύσει συγγενῆ καὶ φίλον	*Oportet igitur in eadem arbore esse, etsi non idem cum omnibus sentias. Qui tibi secundum rectam rationem procedenti impedimento sunt, ut avertere te a recta actione non possunt, ita neque tua erga ipsos benevolentia depellant te: utrobique teipsum eundem serva, ut non modo in iudicando constantia & agendo, sed & adversus eos qui te prohibere conantur aut alias indignantur, mansuetudinem tuearis. Haud enim minus infirmi est illis irasci quam desistere ab actione & concidere metu perculsum: utrumque est eius qui ordinem suum deserit, quod alter metu facit, alter odio cogniti sibi & amici natura.*
English from Greek: As those who stand in your way as you advance by right reason will not be able to turn you from sound action, so let them not strike you out of your kindness toward them. Guard yourself equally on both fronts: not only in steady judgment and action, but in gentleness toward those who try to hinder you or are otherwise difficult. For to be harsh with	English from Latin: It is necessary, therefore, to be on the same tree, even if you do not think the same as everyone else. Just as those who are an impediment to you as you advance according to right reason cannot turn you aside from right action, so let them not drive you away from your goodwill toward them: preserve yourself the same on both fronts, so that

them is a weakness too, just as much as to abandon the action and give in from fright. Both alike are deserters: the one who flinches, and the one who is estranged from his natural kinsman and friend.	you maintain mildness not only in steadfastness of judging and acting, but also toward those who attempt to hinder you or are otherwise indignant. For it is no less a mark of a weak man to be angry with them than to desist from action and collapse, struck with fear: both belong to one who deserts his post—the one doing so out of fear, the other out of hatred for one who is by nature his kinsman and friend. Scholarly Note: The opening clause "Oportet igitur in eadem arbore esse..." summarizes the concluding sentiment of the Greek from the previous section (Ὁμοθαμνεῖν μέν, μὴ ὁμοδογματεῖν δέ) but translates it as part of Section 9's structural frame.

Language Differences: *Xylander lifts Section 8's final Greek sentence (Ὁμοθαμνεῖν μέν...) and positions it as the explicit structural prefix to this section. He translates πραότητος as mansuetudinem.*

Commentary: Opposition presents two symmetrical ways to fail. The first error is to abandon our duty out of fear; the second is to surrender our kindness toward our critics out of frustration. Both reactions are instances of deserting your post. A philosopher must maintain both boundaries simultaneously: firm execution of rational action and gentle goodwill toward those who oppose it.

Book XI · Section 10

Nature and Art

Greek Original	Latin (Xylander 1558)
Οὐκ ἔστι χείρων οὐδεμία φύσις τέχνης˙ καὶ γὰρ αἱ τέχναι τὰςφύσεις μιμοῦνται. εἰ δὲ τοῦτο, ἡ πασῶν τῶν ἄλλων τελεωτάτηκαὶ περιληπτικωτάτη φύσις οὐκ ἂν ἀπολείποιτο τῆς τεχνικῆςεὐμηχανίας. πᾶσαι δέ γε τέχναι τῶν κρειττόνων ἕνεκεν τὰ χείρωποιοῦσιν˙ οὐκοῦν καὶ ἡ κοινὴ φύσις. καὶ δὴ ἔνθεν μὲν γένεσιςδικαιοσύνης, ἀπὸ δὲ ταύτης αἱ λοιπαὶ ἀρεταὶ ὑφίστανται˙ οὐγὰρ τηρηθήσεται τὸ δίκαιον, ἐὰν ἤτοι διαφερώμεθα πρὸς τὰ μέσαἢ εὐεξαπάτητοι καὶ προπτωτικοὶ καὶ μεταπτωτικοὶ ὦμεν	*Nulla natura arte inferior est: quippe cum artes sint naturae imitatrices. Quod si est, utique natura omnium perfectissima & omnia comprehendens, artium sollertiae nequaquam cedet. Porro omnes artes praestantiorum gratia faciunt viliora: ergo & communis natura. Atque hic est ortus iustitiae: ab hac reliquae virtutes dependent: non enim constabit iustitia, si vel rebus suapte natura neque bonis neque malis nimium tribuamus, vel temerarii vel errori procliviores erimus.*

English from Greek: No nature is inferior to art; for the arts imitate natures. If that is so, then the most perfect and comprehensive of all natures cannot fall short of the inventiveness of craft. Now all arts make the lower for the sake of the higher; therefore the common nature does so too. And hence is the birth of justice, and from justice the rest of the virtues have their existence; for justice will not be preserved if we are anxious about things indifferent, or easily deceived, or rash, or changeable.	English from Latin: No nature is inferior to art: inasmuch as arts are imitators of nature. If this is so, then surely the most perfect nature, which encompasses all things, will by no means yield to the cleverness of the arts. Furthermore, all arts make lesser things for the sake of more excellent things: therefore common nature does so too. And this is the origin of justice: from this the remaining virtues depend: for justice will not stand firm if we assign too much to things that are by their own nature neither good nor bad, or if we are rash or too prone to error.

Language Differences: *Marcus's descriptive phrase τεχνικῆς εὐμηχανίας (the resourcefulness / inventiveness of craft) is translated by Xylander as artium sollertiae. The phrase γένεσις δικαιοσύνης maps exactly to ortus iustitiae.*

Commentary: An elegant derivation of human ethics from physics. Since artistic craft patterns its designs on nature, the all-encompassing macro-nature (κοινὴ φύσις) must contain the highest structural organization. Because nature systematically coordinates lower elements to support higher, rational functions, Δικαιοσύνη (Justice) is revealed as a core law of the cosmos.

Book XI · Section 11

Stop Pursuing and Fleeing

Greek Original	Latin (Xylander 1558)
[Εἰ μὲν] Οὐκ ἔρχεται ἐπὶ σὲ τὰ πράγματα ὧν αἱ διώξεις καὶφυγαὶ θορυβοῦσί σε, ἀλλὰ τρόπον τινὰ αὐτὸς ἐπ ἐκεῖνα ἔρχῃ˙ τὸγοῦν κρῖμα τὸ περὶ αὐτῶν ἡσυχαζέτω κἀκεῖνα μενεῖ ἀτρεμοῦντακαὶ οὔτε διώκων οὔτε φεύγων ὀφθήσῃ	*Non veniunt ad te res, quarum fuga vel appetitu perturbaris, sed tu quodam modo ad eas accedis: iudicium itaque de iis quiescat, ita et ipsae quiescent, & neque sequeris eas neque fugies.*
English from Greek: Things do not come to you — the things whose pursuit and avoidance throw you into turmoil; rather, in a way, you go to them. Let your judgment about them, at any rate, be still, and they too will stay unmoved — and you will be seen neither pursuing nor fleeing.	English from Latin: Things do not come to you, by whose flight or desire you are disturbed, but you in some way approach them: therefore let judgment concerning them be still, and thus they themselves will remain still, and you will neither pursue nor flee them.

Language Differences: *The Greek ἀτρεμοῦντα (un-trembling / motionless) is captured by Xylander's verb quiescent (they rest / remain quiet).*

Commentary: A one-sentence physics of desire. Objects are stationary; the commotion is supplied entirely by the mind that runs at them or from them. Still the judgment and the whole field goes quiet — the chase and the flight both vanish, because both were always your own motion.

Book XI · Section 12

The Sphere of the Soul

Greek Original	Latin (Xylander 1558)
Σφαῖρα ψυχῆς αὐτοειδής, ὅταν μήτε ἐκτείνηται ἐπί τι μήτεἔσω συντρέχῃ μήτε σπείρηται μήτε συνιζάνῃ, ἀλλὰ φωτὶ λάμπηταιᾧ τὴν ἀλήθειαν ὁρᾷ τὴν πάντων καὶ τὴν ἐν αὐτῇ	*Animus globo similis est, figurae aequabilis, quando neque effert se neque contrahit, sed lumine fulget quo in omnibus rebus veritatem cernit, & in se quoque ipso.*
English from Greek: The soul a sphere holding its own form: when it neither stretches out toward anything nor shrinks inward, neither scatters nor sinks down, but shines with the light by which it sees the truth of all things and the truth within itself.	English from Latin: The mind is like a globe, of uniform shape, when it neither exalts itself nor contracts, but shines with a light by which it discerns the truth in all things, and also within itself.

Language Differences: *The specialized Greek description αὐτοειδής (holding its own unique, independent form) is rendered by Xylander as figurae aequabilis ("of an equal / uniform shape").*

Commentary: The soul's perfect state is a balanced, luminous sphere. In this state, it sees the truth of both the world and its own nature, undisturbed by external pulls.

Book XI · Section 13

Indifference to Contempt

Greek Original	Latin (Xylander 1558)
Καταφρονήσει μού τις; ὄψεται. ἐγὼ δὲ ὄψομαι ἵνα μή τικαταφρονήσεως ἄξιον πράσσων ἢ λέγων εὑρίσκωμαι. μισήσει;ὄψεται. ἀλλὰ ἐγὼ εὐμενὴς καὶ εὔνους παντὶ καὶ τούτῳ αὐτῷἕτοιμος τὸ παρορώμενον δεῖξαι, οὐκ ὀνειδιστικῶς οὐδὲ ὡςκατεπιδεικνύμενος ὅτι ἀνέχομαι, ἀλλὰ γνησίως καὶ χρηστῶς, οἷοςὁ Φωκίων ἐκεῖνος, εἴ γε μὴ προσεποιεῖτο.	*Contemnor ab aliquo? Viderit. Ego cogitabo ne quid contemptu dignum agam aut loquar. Odit me aliquis? Viderit. Ego quidem omnibus sum placidus & benevolus, atque eo ipso promptus ad ostendendos aliis suos errores: neque hoc exprobrandi causa, aut ut patientiam ostentem meam, sed ingenue & probe. Quantus erat Phocion,*

τὰ ἔσω γὰρ δεῖ τοιαῦταεἶναι καὶ ὑπὸ τῶν θεῶν βλέπεσθαι ἄνθρωπον πρὸς μηδὲνἀγανακτικῶς διατιθέμενον μηδὲ δεινοπαθοῦντα. τί γάρ σοι κακόν,εἰ αὐτὸς νῦν ποιεῖς τὸ τῇ φύσει σου οἰκεῖον καὶ δέχῃ τὸ νῦν τῇτῶν ὅλων φύσει εὔκαιρον, ἄνθρωπος τεταμένος πρὸς τὸ γίνεσθαιδί ὅτου δὴ τὸ κοινῇ συμφέρον	*nisi id ipsum prae se tulisset. Intus enim omnia oportet recte habere, & a diis conspici; hominem nullam rem indigne ferentem aut quiritantem. Quid enim mihi mali accidit, si alius id agit quod est naturae suae? aut cur tu commodum non accipies id quod nunc naturae universi est opportunum, cum sis homo eo destinatus ut communi utilitati inservias?*
English from Greek: Will someone despise me? Let him see to it. I will see to it that I not be found doing or saying anything worthy of contempt. Will he hate me? Let him see to it. But I will be kind and well-disposed to every man, and ready to show this very man what he overlooks — not reproachfully, nor as displaying my forbearance, but sincerely and generously, like the famous Phocion (if indeed he was not putting it on). For the inward parts should be such; and a man should be seen by the gods disposed to no indignation, no grievance. For what evil is it to you, if you yourself are now doing the thing proper to your own nature, and accepting what is now seasonable to the nature of the whole — a man stretched toward this: that the common benefit be brought about by one means or another?	English from Latin: Am I despised by someone? Let him see to it. I shall take care lest I do or speak anything worthy of contempt. Does someone hate me? Let him see to it. I indeed am placid and benevolent to everyone, and by that very fact ready to point out their errors to others: and this not for the sake of reproaching them, or to display my patience, but ingenuously and honestly. How great was Phocion, unless he had made a display of that very thing. For within it is necessary that all things be right, and be seen by the gods; a man bearing nothing with indignation or complaining. For what evil happens to me, if another acts according to his own nature? Or why will you not accept as an advantage that which is now opportune for the nature of the universe, since you are a man destined for this: to serve the common utility? Scholarly Note: Xylander translates "if indeed he was not putting it on" as "nisi id ipsum prae se tulisset" (unless he had made an open display of it), which reverses the skeptical tone of the Greek text regarding Phocion's sincerity.

Language Differences: *Xylander alters Marcus's critical phrase εἴ γε μὴ προσεποιεῖτο (if indeed he was not pretending / acting a part), rendering it as nisi id ipsum prae se tulisset ("unless he had made an open display of it").*

Commentary: Marcus adopts a position of total internal sovereignty. Others' feelings are their responsibility; his only responsibility is his own character. He resolves to be kind even to the person who hates him, like Phocion.

Book XI · Section 14

Social Symmetrical Hypocrisy

Greek Original	Latin (Xylander 1558)

Ἀλλήλων καταφρονοῦντες ἀλλήλοις ἀρεσκεύονται καὶἀλλήλων ὑπερέχειν θέλοντες ἀλλήλοις ὑποκατακλίνονται	*Qui contemnunt se mutuo, idem mutuo se demerentur: & qui mutuo de primatu contendunt, mutuo sibi concedunt.*
English from Greek: Despising one another, they flatter one another; and wishing to rise above one another, they bow down to one another.	English from Latin: Those who despise one another, at the same time curry favor with one another; and those who contend with one another for the primacy, mutually yield to one another.

Language Differences: *Marcus's verb ἀρεσκεύονται (they play the sycophant) matches Xylander's choice of se demerentur.*

Commentary: Marcus observes the irony of human ambition: in trying to rise above others, people actually lower themselves through flattery and deceit.

Book XI · Section 15

Sincerity vs. The Mask

Greek Original	Latin (Xylander 1558)
Ὡς σαπρὸς καὶ κίβδηλος ὁ λέγων˙ ἐγὼ προῄρημαι ἁπλῶς σοιπροσφέρεσθαι. τί ποιεῖς, ἄνθρωπε; τοῦτο οὐ δεῖ προλέγειν. αὐτὸφανήσεται˙ ἐπὶ τοῦ μετώπου γεγράφθαι ὀφείλει˙ εὐθὺς ἡ φωνὴτοιοῦτον ἠχεῖν, εὐθὺς ἐν τοῖς ὄμμασιν ἐξέχειν, ὡς τῶν ἐραστῶνἐν τῷ βλέμματι πάντα εὐθὺς γνωρίζει ὁ ἐρώμενος. τοιοῦτον ὅλωςδεῖ τὸν ἁπλοῦν καὶ ἀγαθὸν εἶναι, οἷον γράσωνα, ἵνα ὁ παραστὰςἅμα τῷ προσελθεῖν, θέλει οὐ θέλει, αἴσθηται. ἐπιτήδευσις δὲἁπλότητος σκάλμη ἐστίν. οὐδέν ἐστιν αἴσχιον λυκοφιλίας˙πάντων μάλιστα τοῦτο φεῦγε. ὁ ἀγαθὸς καὶ ἁπλοῦς καὶ εὐμενὴςἐν τοῖς ὄμμασιν ἔχει ταῦτα καὶ οὐ λανθάνει	*Quam putidus est & falsus ille qui dicit: 'Statui simpliciter tecum agere.' Quid agis? Non erat hoc praefari opus: ipsa res hoc ostendet. Statim ipso in vultu inscriptus debet esse sermo, ac statim ex ipsis oculis apparere: quemadmodum ex aspectu amatores sensum sui amasii statim cognoscunt. Omnino vir bonus & simplex hircosi quiddam debet habere, ut qui ei adest, velit nolit, eius simplicitatem deprehendat. Ostentatio autem simplicitatis insidiae sunt tectae: neque vero quicquam turpius est subdolis ac insidiosis congressibus. Hoc omnium maxime fugito. Bonus, simplex & mansuetus vir haec omnia in oculis habet, neque ea latent.*
English from Greek: How rotten and counterfeit is the man who says: I have chosen to deal plainly with you. What are you doing, man? This needs no announcing. It will appear of itself — it ought to be written on the forehead. It sounds at once in the voice, it shines at once from the eyes, as the beloved knows everything at once in the glance of lovers. The simple and good man should be, in	English from Latin: How rotten and false is he who says: 'I have resolved to deal plainly with you.' What are you doing? There was no need to preface this: the thing itself will show it. Straightway the speech ought to be written upon the very countenance, and straightway appear from the eyes themselves: just as from a glance lovers immediately know the feeling of their beloved. Altogether a good and

sum, like the man with strong scent: whoever stands near perceives it as he approaches, will he or not. The affectation of simplicity is a hidden blade. Nothing is more shameful than wolf-friendship: flee it above all. The good and simple and kind man carries these things in his eyes — and they do not go unnoticed.	simple man ought to have something of a strong scent (like a goat), so that he who is near him, whether he wishes or not, perceives his simplicity. But the ostentation of simplicity consists of hidden snares: nor indeed is anything more shameful than crafty and deceitful associations. Flee this most of all. A good, simple, and gentle man has all these things in his eyes, nor do they remain hidden. Scholarly Note: "Hircosi quiddam" (something goat-like/of a strong body odor) accurately captures the coarse literalness of the Greek γράσωνα, a vivid Stoic metaphor for unavoidable presence.

Language Differences: *Xylander tracks Marcus's coarse noun γράσωνα precisely, using the rare Latin construction hircosi quiddam debet habere.*

Commentary: True goodness should be as obvious as a scent. A man who announces his 'simplicity' is a wolf in sheep's clothing. Sincerity should be written on the forehead and shine in the eyes.

Book XI · Section 16

Happiness through Indifference

Greek Original	Latin (Xylander 1558)
Κάλλιστα διαζῆν, δύναμις αὕτη ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ, ἐὰν πρὸς τὰἀδιάφορά τις ἀδιαφορῇ. ἀδιαφορήσει δέ, ἐὰν ἕκαστον αὐτῶνθεωρῇ διῃρημένως καὶ ὁλικῶς καὶ μεμνημένος ὅτι οὐδὲν αὐτῶνὑπόληψιν περὶ αὐτοῦ ἡμῖν ἐμποιεῖ οὐδὲ ἔρχεται ἐφ ἡμᾶς, ἀλλὰτὰ μὲν ἀτρεμεῖ, ἡμεῖς δέ ἐσμεν οἱ τὰς περὶ αὐτῶν κρίσεις γεννῶντεςκαὶ οἷον γράφοντες ἐν ἑαυτοῖς, ἐξὸν μὲν μὴ γράφειν, ἐξὸν δέ, κἄνπου λάθῃ, εὐθὺς ἐξαλεῖψαι˙ ὅτι ὀλίγου χρόνου ἔσται ἡ τοιαύτηπροσοχὴ καὶ λοιπὸν πεπαύσεται ὁ βίος. τί μέντοι δύσκολον ἔχειταῦτα; εἰ μὲν γὰρ κατὰ φύσιν ἐστί, χαῖρε αὐτοῖς καὶ ῥᾴδια ἔσταισοι˙ εἰ δὲ παρὰ φύσιν, ζήτει τί ἐστί σοι κατὰ τὴν σὴν φύσιν καὶἐπὶ τοῦτο σπεῦδε κἂν ἄδοξον ᾖ˙ παντὶ γὰρ συγγνώμη τὸ ἴδιονἀγαθὸν ζητοῦντι	*Rectissime vivendi facultas est in tuo animo posita, nimirum ut res neque bonas neque malas in nullo ponas discrimine. Id fiet, si unamquamlibet eorum contempleris divisim, & ratione totius, memor nullam earum in animis nostris de se posse excitare opinionem, neque ad nos venire — sed ipsas quidem quiescere, nos autem esse qui de iis iudicia faciamus apud nos, easque nobis quasi depingamus: cui liceat etiam omnino non depingere illas, aut si hoc omnino sit admissum, statim delere. Exigui temporis attentio haec est, inde finis erit vitae. Quid obstat quominus haec recte habeant? Quae si sunt secundum naturam, gaude illis & erunt facilia; si contra naturam, quaere quid sit tibi secundum naturam, atque id contende, etiamsi gloria careat.*

	Ignoscendum enim ei qui sui quaerit bonum.
English from Greek: To live out life in the noblest way — this power lies in the soul, if a man is indifferent toward things indifferent. And he will be indifferent if he contemplates each of them divided into its parts and as a whole, and remembers that none of them creates our opinion about it, nor comes to us; the things stand still — it is we who generate the judgments about them and, as it were, write them upon ourselves, though it is open to us not to write them, and open, if one slips in unnoticed, to wipe it out at once. Remember too that such attention will be needed only a little while, and then life will have ended. And what difficulty, after all, do these things hold? If they are according to nature, rejoice in them and they will be easy for you; if contrary to nature, seek what accords with your own nature and press toward that, even if it brings no glory — for every man is pardoned for seeking his own good.	English from Latin: The faculty of living most rightly is placed within your soul, namely, if you place things that are neither good nor bad in no distinction. This will happen if you contemplate any single one of them separately, and by the rationale of the whole, remembering that none of them can excite an opinion about itself in our minds, nor come to us—but they themselves remain quiet, while we are the ones who make judgments about them among ourselves, and describe them to ourselves, as it were: when it is permitted to us either not to describe them at all, or if this has been admitted entirely, to erase it immediately. This attention is of a short time, and then there will be an end of life. What prevents these things from being right? If these are according to nature, rejoice in them and they will be easy; if contrary to nature, seek what is according to your own nature, and strive for it, even if it lacks glory. For he who seeks his own good must be pardoned.

Language Differences: *The unique Greek ὑπολῃπτικὴν δύναμιν is parsed by Xylander as facultatem cogitatricem.*

Commentary: Life becomes excellent when the soul stops assigning value (good / evil) to things outside its control. By breaking external objects into their atoms, we realize they have no power over our minds.

Book XI · Section 17

Helping the Erring

Greek Original	Latin (Xylander 1558)
Πόθεν ἐλήλυθεν ἕκαστον καὶ ἐκ τίνων ἕκαστον ὑποκειμένωνκαὶ εἰς τί μεταβάλλει καὶ οἷον ἔσται μεταβαλὸν καὶ ὡς οὐδὲν κακὸν πείσεται. [Καὶ]	*Vide unde venerint omnia, ex quibus constent, in quod mutentur, qualia sint inde futura, tum nihil mali eis accidere.*
English from Greek: Of each thing ask: whence has it come, of what materials does it consist, into what does it change, what will it be when changed — and that it will suffer no evil in the changing.	English from Latin: See whence all things have come, out of what things they consist, into what they are changed, what sort of things they will be in the future from that source, and then that no evil happens to

	them.

Language Differences: *The brief formula is systematically tracked by Xylander, with ὡς οὐδὲν κακὸν πείσεται mapped precisely to nihil mali eis accidere.*

Commentary: The analytic catechism in its shortest form: origin, composition, destination, condition after change. The fourth answer is the consolation hidden in the method — what a thing becomes by changing is no evil to it, and the questioner, applying the series to himself, reaches the same verdict about his own dissolution.

Book XI · Section 18

Eleven Precepts Against Anger

Greek Original	Latin (Xylander 1558)
Πρῶτον, τίς ἡ πρὸς αὐτούς μοι σχέσις καὶ ὅτι ἀλλήλωνἕνεκεν γεγόναμεν καὶ καθ ἕτερον λόγον προστησόμενος αὐτῶνγέγονα ὡς κριὸς ποίμνης ἢ ταῦρος ἀγέλης. ἄνωθεν δὲ ἔπιθι ἀπὸτοῦ˙ εἰ μὴ ἄτομοι, φύσις ἡ τὰ ὅλα διοικοῦσα˙ εἰ τοῦτο, τὰ χείρονατῶν κρειττόνων ἕνεκεν, ταῦτα δὲ ἀλλήλων.Δεύτερον δέ, ὁποῖοί τινές εἰσιν ἐπὶ τῆς τραπέζης, ἐν τῷ κλιναρίῳ,τἆλλα˙ μάλιστα δέ, οἵας ἀνάγκας δογμάτων κειμένας ἔχουσι˙καὶ αὐτὰ δὲ ταῦτα, μεθ οἵου τύφου ποιοῦσιν.Τρίτον, ὅτι, εἰ μὲν ὀρθῶς ταῦτα ποιοῦσιν, οὐ δεῖ δυσχεραίνειν˙εἰ δ οὐκ ὀρθῶς, δηλονότι ἄκοντες καὶ ἀγνοοῦντες˙ - πᾶσα γὰρψυχὴ ἄκουσα στέρεται, ὥσπερ τοῦ ἀληθοῦς, οὕτως καὶ τοῦ κατάξίαν ἑκάστῳ προσφέρεσθαι - ἄχθονται γοῦν ἀκούοντες ἀδικοικαὶ ἀγνώμονες καὶ πλεονέκται καὶ καθάπαξ ἁμαρτητικοὶ περὶτοὺς πλησίον.Τέταρτον, ὅτι καὶ αὐτὸς πολλὰ ἁμαρτάνεις καὶ ἄλλος τοιοῦτοςεἶ˙ καὶ εἴ τινων δὲ ἁμαρτημάτων ἀπέχῃ, ἀλλὰ τήν γε ἕξινἐποιστικὴν ἔχεις, εἰ καὶ διὰ δειλίαν ἢ δοξοκοπίαν ἢ τοιοῦτό τικακὸν ἀπέχῃ τῶν ὁμοίων ἁμαρτημάτων.Πέμπτον, ὅτι οὐδὲ εἰ ἁμαρτάνουσι κατείληφας˙ πολλὰ γὰρ κατοἰκονομίαν γίνεται καὶ ὅλως πολλὰ δεῖ πρότερον μαθεῖν, ἵνα τιςπερὶ ἀλλοτρίας πράξεως καταληπτικῶς τι	*Primum, quis mihi ad eos respectus? Nati sumus invicem unus alterius gratia. Alia autem ratione natus sum ut ipsis praesim, sicut aries gregi aut taurus armento. Rem altius repete. Si non constat mundus ex atomis, utique natura eum gubernat. Quod si detur, inferiora praestantiorum gratia sunt, haec vero unum propter alterum. — Deinde, quales illi sunt in mensa, lecto, alibi? Maxime autem quibus illi sunt necessario opinionibus addicti, & quanto cum fastu agunt sua. — Tertium est: si recte faciunt haec, non est indigne ferendum; sin secus, at non sponte sed ignoratione peccant. Omnis enim anima invita privatur cum veritate, tum eo ut possit cum uno quolibet ut est dignum vivere. Itaque dolore afficitur si iniusti, ingrati, avari, omninoque iniurii erga alios dicantur. — Quartum est: ipse quoque in multis delinquis, esque ipsorum similis: ac tamen etiamsi quibusdam peccatis abstines, tamen habitum ea faciendi habes, ac vel metus vel gloriolae consectandae causa aut aliud ob malum abstines similibus peccatis. — Quintum: ne hoc quidem satis scis, an peccent. Quaedam enim ordine fiunt. Omnino autem multa experiri opus, antequam certum aliquid de aliorum actionibus*

ἀποφήνηται.Ἕκτον, ὅτι, ὅταν λίαν ἀγανακτῇς ἢ καὶ δυσπαθῇς, ἀκαριαῖοςὁ ἀνθρώπινος βίος καὶ μετ ὀλίγον πάντες ἐξετάθημεν.Ἕβδομον, ὅτι οὐχ αἱ πράξεις αὐτῶν ἐνοχλοῦσιν ἡμῖν˙ ἐκεῖναιγάρ εἰσιν ἐν τοῖς ἐκείνων ἡγεμονικοῖς˙ ἀλλὰ αἱ ἡμέτεραιὑπολήψεις. ἆρον γοῦν καὶ θέλησον ἀφεῖναι τὴν ὡς περὶ δεινοῦκρίσιν καὶ ἀπῆλθεν ἡ ὀργή. πῶς οὖν ἀρεῖς; λογισάμενος ὅτι οὐκαίσχρόν˙ ἐὰν γὰρ μὴ μόνον ᾖ τὸ αἰσχρὸν κακόν, ἀνάγκη καὶ σὲπολλὰ ἁμαρτάνειν καὶ λῃστὴν καὶ παντοῖον γίνεσθαι.Ὄγδοον, ὅσῳ χαλεπώτερα ἐπιφέρουσιν αἱ ὀργαὶ καὶ λῦπαι αἰὲπὶ τοῖς τοιούτοις, ἥπερ αὐτά ἐστιν ἐφ οἷς ὀργιζόμεθα καὶλυπούμεθα.Ἔνατον, ὅτι τὸ εὐμενὲς ἀνίκητον, ἐὰν γνήσιον ᾖ καὶ μὴ σεσηρὸςμηδὲ ὑπόκρισις. τί γάρ σοι ποιήσει ὁ ὑβριστικώτατος, ἐὰν διατελῇςεὐμενὴς αὐτῷ καί, εἰ οὕτως ἔτυχε, πράῳς παραινῇς καὶμεταδιδάσκῃς εὐσχολῶν παρ᾽ αὐτὸν ἐκεῖνον τὸν καιρὸν ὅτεκακοποιεῖν σε ἐπιχειρεῖ˙ “μή, τέκνον˙ πρὸς ἄλλο πεφύκαμεν˙ ἐγὼμὲν οὐ μὴ βλαβῶ, σὺ δὲ βλάπτῃ, τέκνον.” καὶ δεικνύναι εὐαφῶςκαὶ ὁλικῶς ὅτι τοῦτο οὕτως ἔχει, ὅτι οὐδὲ μέλισσαι αὐτὸ ποιοῦσινοὐδ ὅσα συναγελαστικὰ πέφυκε. δεῖ δὲ μήτε εἰρωνικῶς αὐτὸποιεῖν μήτε ὀνειδιστικῶς, ἀλλὰ φιλοστόργως καὶ ἀδήκτως τῇ ψυχῇκαὶ μὴ ὡς ἐν σχολῇ μηδὲ ἵνα ἄλλος παραστὰς θαυμάσῃ, ἀλλ ᾖτοι πρὸς μόνον καὶ ἐὰν ἄλλοι τινὲς περιεστήκωσι.Τούτων τῶν ἐννέα κεφαλαίων μέμνησο ὡς παρὰ τῶν Μουσῶνδῶρα εἰληφὼς καὶ ἄρξαι ποτὲ ἄνθρωπος εἶναι, ἕως ζῇς. φυλακτέονδὲ ἐπίσης τῷ ὀργίζεσθαι αὐτοῖς τὸ κολακεύειν αὐτούς˙ ἀμφότεραγὰρ ἀκοινώνητα καὶ πρὸς βλάβην φέρει. πρόχειρον δὲ ἐν ταῖςὀργαῖς ὅτι οὐχὶ τὸ θυμοῦσθαι ἀνδρικόν, ἀλλὰ τὸ πρᾶον καὶἥμερον ὥσπερ ἀνθρωπικώτερον, οὕτως καὶ ἀῤῥενικώτερον, καὶἰσχύος καὶ νεύρων καὶ ἀνδρείας τούτῳ μέτεστιν, οὐχὶ τῷἀγανακτοῦντι καὶ δυσαρεστοῦντι˙ ὅσῳ γὰρ ἀπαθείᾳ τοῦτοοἰκειότερον, τοσούτῳ καὶ δυνάμει, ὥσπερ τε ἡ λύπη ἀσθενοῦς,οὕτως καὶ ἡ ὀργή˙ ἀμφότεροι γὰρ τέτρωνται καὶ

statuas. — Sextum: ut maxime stomacheris, tamen vita hominum est momentanea, ac paulo post omnes morimur. — Septimum: non actiones ipsorum nobis molestiam exhibent (cum eae sint in ipsorum animis), sed nostrae opiniones. Itaque tolle voluntatem iudicandi de re aliqua tanquam mala: simul sustuleris iram. Quomodo, inquies, tollam? Si reputes non esse rem turpem. Nam nisi sola turpitudo malum esset, tu quoque necessario multis modis peccares, fieresque latro & omnia tentares. — Octavum: multo graviora adferunt dolor & ira quae ob aliorum peccata concipimus, quam ipsa illa ob quae irascimur & dolemus. — Nona: mansuetudo, si genuina sit, non adscititia aut fucata, invicta est. Quid vero vel extremae libidinis homo tibi faciet, si constanter mansuetudinem serves, ac si res ita ferat, placide eum horteris ac doceas eo ipso tempore quo is te laedere nititur? Si dicas: 'Noli, fili; ad alias res nati sumus: ego quidem non laedar, sed tu'; idque ei aperte & integre ostendas, neque apes neque ullum aliud eorum quae ad coetum apta sunt natura animalium ita agere. Oportet autem neque irridendi neque conviciandi causa hoc facere, sed amanter, atque ita ut ne cor mordeatur, neve etiam abuti videaris, ac ne quis adstans miretur, sed ut cum solo, ita loqui debes, etiamsi alii adsint. Horum novem capitulorum memento, tanquam a Musis dono accepisses. Ac incipe tandem homo esse dum vivis. Ita vero cavendum ne irascaris eis, quam ne aduleris: utrumque enim a societate est alienum & damnosum. In promptu tibi sit, ira accedente, non esse iram viri sed mansuetudinem: id ut humanius, ita & virilius est, requiritque robur, nervos & fortitudinem, quae non sunt apud indignantes & morosos. Nam quanto propinquior est mansuetudo vacuitati affectuum, tanto & potentiae: ac quemadmodum dolor in impotentes cadit, sic & ira. Uterque enim vulnus accepit, & herbam porrexit. Quod si lubet, etiam decimum a duce Musarum donum accipe: nempe, insani esse velle

ἐνδεδώκασιν.Εἰ δὲ βούλει, καὶ δέκατον παρὰ τοῦ Μουσηγέτου δῶρον λάβε,ὅτι τὸ ἀξιοῦν μὴ ἁμαρτάνειν τοὺς φαύλους μανικόν˙ ἀδυνάτουγὰρ ἐφίεται. τὸ δὲ συγχωρεῖν ‹εἰς› ἄλλους μὲν εἶναι τοιούτους,ἀξιοῦν δὲ μὴ εἰς σὲ ἁμαρτάνειν, ἄγνωμον καὶ τυραννικόν	*ne pravi homines peccent; qui enim hoc petit, id petit quod fieri non potest. Aliis vero concedere ut sint mali, modo ne in te peccent, ingrati est & tyranni.*
English from Greek: First: what is my relation to them? We came into being for one another's sake; and, on another reckoning, I came to stand at their head, as the ram heads the flock and the bull the herd. Go back further, from this principle: if not atoms, then nature governs the whole; if so, the lower are for the sake of the higher, and the higher for one another. Second: what kind of men they are at table, in bed, and elsewhere; above all, what compulsions of opinion lie upon them — and with what pride they do these very things. Third: that if they do these things rightly, one must not be vexed; and if not rightly, then plainly they act unwillingly and in ignorance — for every soul is deprived unwillingly, as of truth, so also of the power of treating each man according to his worth; at any rate they smart at being called unjust, ungracious, grasping, and in a word wrongdoers toward their neighbors. Fourth: that you too do much wrong yourself, and are another such as they; and if you do hold back from certain wrongs, still you carry the disposition that inclines to them — even if cowardice, or care for reputation, or some other such meanness keeps you from committing the like. Fifth: that you have not even fully grasped whether they are doing wrong; for many things are done as part of some larger management — and in general a man must learn a great deal before he can declare with comprehension upon another's action. Sixth: when you are exceedingly indignant or even suffering over it — that man's life is a moment, and in a little while we are all laid out. Seventh: that it is not their actions that trouble us — those rest in their ruling faculties — but our own opinions. Remove the opinion, will the judgment 'terrible' away, and the anger has gone. How remove it? By reckoning that what was done is no shame to you; for unless shame alone is evil, you too must do	English from Latin: First, what is my relation to them? We were born for the sake of one another. And by another reckoning, I was born to stand at their head, just as a ram heads the flock or a bull the herd. Trace the matter higher: if the world does not consist of atoms, then surely nature governs it. If this be granted, lower things exist for the sake of more excellent things, and these latter for one another. — Second, what sort of people are they at table, in bed, and elsewhere? Above all, to what opinions are they necessarily bound, and with how much pride do they perform their actions? — Third: if they do these things rightly, it must not be borne with indignation; but if otherwise, they clearly sin not voluntarily but through ignorance. For every soul is unwillingly deprived both of truth and of the ability to live with each single person as is worthy. Therefore it is afflicted with grief if they are called unjust, ungrateful, avaricious, and altogether injurious toward others. — Fourth: you yourself also offend in many things, and are similar to them: and yet even if you abstain from certain sins, you nevertheless possess the habit of committing them, and either out of fear or for the sake of pursuing a bit of glory or on account of some other evil do you abstain from similar sins. — Fifth: you do not even know this sufficiently, whether they are sinning. For certain things are done by way of arrangement. In short, it is necessary to experience many things before you can establish anything certain about the actions of others. — Sixth: even if you are exceedingly angry, nevertheless the life of men is momentary, and after a little while we all die. — Seventh: it is not their actions that present trouble to us (since those exist in their own minds), but our own opinions. Therefore take away the willingness to judge concerning any matter as if it were bad: at the same time you will have taken

much wrong, and become a bandit and every other kind of man. Eighth: how much harsher are the things that anger and the grief that follows such matters bring, than the very matters at which we are angered and grieved. Ninth: that kindness is unconquerable, if it be genuine — not a smirk, nor a performance. For what can the most insolent man do to you, if you remain kind to him, and, as occasion allows, gently admonish him and re-teach him at leisure, at the very moment he tries to do you harm: 'No, child; we came into being for other things. I shall not be harmed — but you are harming yourself, child.' And show him delicately, by the general truth, that this is so — that not even bees act this way, nor any of the creatures formed for herding. Do it neither in mockery nor as a reproach, but with affection and with a soul unstung — not as in a schoolroom, nor to impress some bystander, but truly to him alone, even if others happen to be present. Remember these nine points as gifts received from the Muses; and begin at last to be a human being, while you live. Guard equally against flattering men and against being angry with them — both are unsocial and both bring harm. And in your angers let this be at hand: that rage is not manly, but that gentleness and mildness, as they are more human, are also more masculine; and that strength and sinew and courage belong to this man, not to the indignant and discontented — for the nearer to impassivity, the nearer to power; and as grief is the mark of weakness, so too is anger: both are wounded, and both have surrendered. And if you will, receive a tenth gift from the Leader of the Muses: that to demand that worthless men not do wrong is the demand of a madman, for it asks the impossible; and to permit them to wrong others, while demanding they do no wrong to you, is unfeeling and tyrannical.

away anger. How, you will say, shall I take it away? If you consider that it is not a shameful thing. For unless shame alone were an evil, you also would necessarily sin in many ways, and become a bandit and attempt everything. — Eighth: the grief and anger which we conceive on account of the sins of others bring much heavier burdens than those very things at which we are angry and grieved. — Ninth: mildness, if it be genuine, and not assumed or painted over, is unconquerable. For what will a man of even the most extreme insolence do to you, if you constantly preserve mildness, and if the matter so requires, you calmly exhort and teach him at that very time when he is striving to injure you? If you say: 'Do not do so, my son; we were born for other things: I indeed shall not be injured, but you will'; and if you show him this openly and completely, that neither bees nor any other of the animals which are by nature suited for a flock act in this way. But it is necessary to do this neither for the sake of mocking nor of reproaching, but lovingly, and in such a way that the heart is not stung, nor that you appear to abuse him, nor that anyone standing by may wonder, but you ought to speak so as if with him alone, even if others are present. Remember these nine chapters, just as if you had received a gift from the Muses. And begin at last to be a man while you live. But care must be taken neither to be angry with them nor to flatter them: for both are alienated from society and harmful. Let it be ready at hand for you, when anger approaches, that anger is not the part of a man, but mildness: as this is more human, so also it is more masculine, and it requires strength, sinews, and fortitude, which are not present among the indignant and morose. For by how much closer mildness is to freedom from passions, by so much more is it closer to power: and just as grief falls upon the weak, so also does anger. For both have received a wound, and both have surrendered. And if it pleases you, receive also a tenth gift from the leader of the Muses: namely, that it is the mark of a madman to wish that wicked men do not sin; for he who seeks this, seeks that which

	cannot happen. But to concede to others that they may be bad, provided they do not sin against you, is the mark of an ungrateful man and a tyrant. Scholarly Note: In point 7, Xylander uses "turpido/turpem" to match the Greek αἰσχρόν. In point 9, "herbam porrexit" is a classical idiom for acknowledging defeat (surrendering), neatly rendering the Greek ἐνδεδώκασιν. In point 10, "Leader of the Muses" translates Μουσηγέτου.

Language Differences: *Xylander tracks this standard analytical block cleanly. In Point 9, he famously deploys the Roman phrase herbam porrexit to capture the Greek verb ἐνδεδώκασιν (acknowledging defeat or surrendering).*

Commentary: The summit of Book XI and the most complete anger-protocol in ancient literature. The arguments ascend from sociology through epistemology to the two great reversals — the anger hurts more than the offense, and kindness, if genuine and unperformed, is unconquerable.

Book XI · Section 19

Four Distortions to Avoid

Greek Original	Latin (Xylander 1558)
Τέσσαρας μάλιστα τροπὰς τοῦ ἡγεμονικοῦ παραφυλακτέονδιηνεκῶς καὶ ἐπειδὰν φωράσῃς ἀπαλειπτέον, ἐπιλέγοντα ἐφέκάστου οὕτως˙ τοῦτο τὸ φάντασμα οὐκ ἀναγκαῖον˙ τοῦτο λυτικὸνκοινωνίας˙ τοῦτο οὐκ ἀπὸ σαυτοῦ μέλλεις λέγειν˙ τὸ γὰρ μὴ ἀφέαυτοῦ λέγειν ἐν τοῖς ἀτοπωτάτοις νόμιζε. τέταρτον δέ ἐστι καθὸ σεαυτῷ ὀνειδιεῖς, ὅτι τοῦτο ἡττωμένου ἐστὶ καὶ ὑποκατακλινομένουτοῦ ἐν σοὶ θειοτέρου μέρους τῇ ἀτιμοτέρᾳ καὶ θνητῇμοίρᾳ, τῇ τοῦ σώματος καὶ ταῖς τούτου παχείαις ἡδοναῖς	*Quatuor potissimum motus animi continenter sunt observandi, ac si eos deprehendas, inhibendi. Primo, ut dicas: haec cogitatio non erat necessaria. Alterum: hoc facit ad societatis dissolutionem. Tertium: hoc non ex te dices — nam non a se dicere quicquam absurdissimum est reputandum. Quartum, ubi tibi ipse exprobres: esse hoc eius qui diviniore sui parte vincatur & cedat ignobiliori & mortali parti, corpori scilicet & eius crassis voluptatibus.*
English from Greek: There are four turnings of the ruling faculty against which you must keep constant guard, and which you must wipe out when detected, saying in each case: this impression is not necessary; this one dissolves community; this you are not about to say from yourself — and consider that not speaking from	English from Latin: Four movements of the soul especially must be observed continuously, and if you detect them, they must be restrained. First, so that you say: this thought was not necessary. Second: this works toward the dissolution of society. Third: this you will not speak from yourself—for to say anything not from

yourself is among the most absurd of things. The fourth is that by which you will reproach yourself: that your more divine part is being conquered and bowing down to the less honorable, mortal portion — the body and its gross pleasures.	oneself must be considered most absurd. Fourth, where you reproach yourself: that this belongs to one whose more divine part is conquered and yields to the more ignoble and mortal part, namely, the body and its gross pleasures.

Language Differences: *Marcus's τοῦτο τὸ φάντασμα (unnecessary sensory image / impression) is localized cleanly as haec cogitatio.*

Commentary: Guard against four turnings of the ruling faculty: (1) useless thoughts; (2) unsocial thoughts; (3) dishonest speech (hypocrisy); (4) the soul being mastered by the body — a rebellion of the mortal part against the divine spark.

Book XI · Section 20

The Discipline of Elements

Greek Original	Latin (Xylander 1558)
Τὸ μὲν πνευματικόν σου καὶ τὸ πυρῶδες πᾶν, ὅσον ἐγκέκραται,καίτοι φύσει ἀνωφερῆ ὄντα, ὅμως πειθόμενα τῇ τῶν ὅλων διατάξειπαρακρατεῖται ἐνταῦθα ἐπὶ τοῦ συγκρίματος. καὶ τὸ γεῶδες δὲτὸ ἐν σοὶ πᾶν καὶ τὸ ὑγρόν, καίτοι κατωφερῆ ὄντα, ὅμως ἐγήγερταικαὶ ἕστηκε τὴν οὐχ ἑαυτῶν φυσικὴν στάσιν. οὕτως ἄρα καὶ τὰστοιχεῖα ὑπακούει τοῖς ὅλοις, ἐπειδάν που καταταχθῇ, βίᾳσυμμένοντα μέχρις ἂν ἐκεῖθεν πάλιν τὸ ἐνδόσιμον τῆς διαλύσεωςσημήνῃ. οὐ δεινὸν οὖν μόνον τὸ νοερόν σου μέρος ἀπειθὲς εἶναικαὶ ἀγανακτεῖν τῇ ἑαυτοῦ χώρᾳ; καίτοι οὐδέν γε βίαιον τούτῳἐπιτάσσεται, ἀλλὰ μόνα ὅσα κατὰ φύσιν ἐστὶν αὐτῷ˙ οὐ μέντοιἀνέχεται, ἀλλὰ τὴν ἐναντίαν φέρεται. ἡ γὰρ ἐπὶ τὰ ἀδικήματακαὶ τὰ ἀκολαστήματα καὶ τὰς ὀργὰς καὶ τὰς λύπας καὶ τοὺςφόβους κίνησις οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἐστὶν ἢ ἀφισταμένου τῆς φύσεως.καὶ ὅταν δέ τινι τῶν συμβαινόντων δυσχεραίνῃ τὸ ἡγεμονικόν,καταλείπει καὶ τότε τὴν ἑαυτοῦ χώραν˙ πρὸς ὁσιότητα γὰρ καὶθεοσέβειαν κατεσκεύασται οὐχ ἧττον ἢ πρὸς δικαιοσύνην. καὶγὰρ ταῦτα ἐν εἴδει ἐστὶ τῆς εὐκοινωνησίας, μᾶλλον δὲ	*Aer & omnes igneae particulae quae commixtae sunt tuo temperamento, etsi natura sursum efferantur, tamen ut obediant ordini universi, ab ipsa mixtione continentur. Similiter omne terrenum in te & humidum, cum natura sua deorsum ferantur, tamen in sublimi manent, non in suo naturali loco. Adeo elementa universo obtemperant, ac, si quo destinentur, per vim manent donec dissolutionis rursum canat classicum. Nonne igitur iniquum sit solam tuam rationem nolle obedire & sui loci indigne ferre? Et quidem nihil ei violentum imponitur, ea modo quae eius naturae conveniunt. Et tamen ea non sustinet, sed in contrarium fertur. Motus enim ad iniustitiam, luxuriem, iram, dolores & metus, nihil aliud est quam secessio a natura: & cum animus aliquid eorum quae eveniunt indigne fert, tunc quoque sui locum deserit. Etenim ad aequalitatem & pietatem constructus est haud minus quam ad iustitiam: quia & hae species sunt virtutum, quibus bene defenditur societas humana, immo etiam antiquiores ipsis iustis actionibus.*

πρεσβύτερατῶν δικαιοπραγημάτων	
English from Greek: Your breath-like part and all the fiery part mixed into you, though by nature borne upward, nevertheless obey the ordering of the whole and are held down here in the compound. And the earthy in you, all of it, and the moist, though borne downward, nevertheless are raised up and hold a station not naturally their own. So even the elements obey the whole — when stationed anywhere, they remain under constraint until the signal of dissolution sounds for them again from the same source. Is it not strange, then, that only your intelligent part should be disobedient and indignant at its own station? Yet nothing violent is laid upon it — only what accords with its nature; and still it will not endure, but is carried the opposite way. For the movement toward injustice and self-indulgence, toward angers and griefs and fears, is nothing but the movement of one deserting nature. And whenever the ruling faculty is discontented with anything that happens, then too it deserts its post; for it was framed for holiness and piety toward the gods no less than for justice — these too are forms of good fellowship, indeed elder than acts of justice.	English from Latin: The air and all the fiery particles which are mixed into your temperament, although by nature they are carried upward, nevertheless, so that they may obey the order of the universe, are held together by that very mixture. Similarly, all that is earthy and moist in you, although by their own nature they are carried downward, nevertheless remain on high, not in their natural place. Thus the elements obey the universe, and, if they are assigned anywhere, they remain by force until the signal for dissolution sounds again. Is it not therefore unjust that your reason alone refuses to obey and bears its post with indignation? And indeed nothing violent is imposed upon it, only those things which suit its nature. And yet it does not endure them, but is carried into the contrary. For movement toward injustice, luxury, anger, griefs, and fears is nothing else than a withdrawal from nature: and when the mind bears any of those things which happen with indignation, then also it deserts its post. For it was constructed for equality and piety no less than for justice: because these also are species of virtues by which human society is well defended, indeed even more ancient than just actions themselves. Scholarly Note: "Donec dissolutionis rursum canat classicum" is a vivid military rendering by Xylander for the Greek signal of dissolution. "Aequalitatem" is used here to translate standard civic fairness or holiness structures linked with ὁσιότης.

Language Differences: *Note the elegant early-modern phrasing introduced by Xylander to translate the signal of material dissolution: donec dissolutionis rursum canat classicum ("until the trumpet-signal of dissolution sounds again").*

Commentary: An argument from the obedience of matter. Fire and breath strain upward, earth and water downward; all four serve at assigned posts against their inclinations until dissolution releases them. Only the mind — the one part whose assigned station actually agrees with its nature — mutinies.

Book XI · Section 21

Consistency of Aim

Greek Original	Latin (Xylander 1558)
“Ὃι μὴ εἷς καὶ ὁ αὐτός ἐστιν ἀεὶ τοῦ βίου σκοπός, οὗτος εἷςκαὶ ὁ αὐτὸς δὲ ὅλου τοῦ βίου εἶναι οὐ δύναται.” οὐκ ἀρκεῖ τὸειρημένον, ἐὰν μὴ κἀκεῖνο προσθῇς, ὁποῖον εἶναι δεῖ τοῦτον τὸνσκοπόν. ὥσπερ γὰρ οὐχ ἡ πάντων τῶν ὁπωσοῦν τοῖς πλείοσιδοκούντων ἀγαθῶν ὑπόληψις ὁμοία ἐστίν, ἀλλ ἡ τῶν τοιῶνδέτινων, τουτέστι τῶν κοινῶν, οὕτω καὶ τὸν σκοπὸν δεῖ τὸνκοινωνικὸν καὶ πολιτικὸν ὑποστήσασθαι. ὁ γὰρ εἰς τοῦτον πάσαςτὰς ἰδίας ὁρμὰς ἀπευθύνων πάσας τὰς πράξεις ὁμοίας ἀποδώσειεκαὶ κατὰ τοῦτο ἀεὶ ὁ αὐτὸς ἔσται	*Qui non eundem per omnem vitam propositum habet scopum, is unus & idem esse per totam vitam nequit. Non satis est id quod diximus, nisi & hoc addatur, qualem esse oporteat eum scopum. Quemadmodum enim non est similis de bonis utcumque plurium opinio, sed quae est certorum quorundam communis: ita & scopus civilis & communitatem respiciens est statuendus. Ad hunc qui omnes suos animi impetus direxerit, omnes actiones similes reddet, eoque modo semper sui erit similis.*
English from Greek: 'He who has not one and the same aim of life, always, cannot be one and the same through the whole of life.' The saying does not suffice unless you add of what kind this aim should be. For as the conception of all the things that seem good to the many in whatever way is not uniform, but only the conception of certain ones — those, namely, that concern the common good — so the aim we set up must be the social and civic aim. For he who directs all his own impulses to this will render all his actions alike, and thereby will always be the same man.	English from Latin: He who does not have one and the same goal proposed through all his life cannot be one and the same through his whole life. What we have said is not sufficient, unless this also is added: of what sort that goal ought to be. For just as the opinion concerning goods among the majority is not uniform, but only that which is common to certain specific goods: so also a civic goal that respects the community must be established. He who directs all his impulses of mind toward this will render all his actions uniform, and in that manner will always be consistent with himself.

Language Differences: *Marcus's core tracking term τοῦ βίου σκοπός is translated directly as omnem vitam propositum … scopum.*

Commentary: Character is defined by its goal. The only stable and worthy goal is the common good — acting as a citizen of the universe.

Book XI · Section 22

The Fable of the Mice

Greek Original	Latin (Xylander 1558)
Τὸν μῦν τὸν ὀρεινὸν καὶ τὸν κατοικίδιον καὶ τὴν πτοίαν τούτουκαὶ διασόβησιν	*Murem montanum, et domesticum, huiusque pavorem & fugam.*
English from Greek: The mountain mouse and the house mouse — and the fright and	English from Latin: The mountain mouse, and the domestic mouse, and the terror

scurrying of the latter.	and flight of the latter.

Language Differences: *πτοίαν καὶ διασόβησιν maps exactly to Xylander's choice of pavorem & fugam.*

Commentary: Marcus uses the Town Mouse and Country Mouse fable to remind himself that luxury brings anxiety, while simplicity brings peace.

Book XI · Section 23

Socrates and Bogeymen

Greek Original	Latin (Xylander 1558)
‹Ὁ› Σωκράτης καὶ τὰ τῶν πολλῶν δόγματα Λαμίας ἐκάλει,παιδίων δείματα	*Socrates & vulgi opiniones Lamias vocabat, puerorum terriculamenta.*
English from Greek: Socrates used to call the opinions of the many 'Lamias' — bogeys to frighten children.	English from Latin: Socrates used to call the opinions of the common people 'Lamias'—bogeys to frighten children.

Language Differences: *παιδίων δείματα becomes puerorum terriculamenta.*

Commentary: Public opinion is a ghost or a 'Lamia' — it has no power over a rational adult who sees through the illusion.

Book XI · Section 24

Spartan Shade

Greek Original	Latin (Xylander 1558)
‹Οἱ› Λακεδαιμόνιοι τοῖς μὲν ξένοις ἐν ταῖς θεωρίαις ὑπὸ τῇσκιᾷ τὰ βάθρα ἐτίθεσαν, αὐτοὶ δὲ οᾗ ἔτυχεν, ἐκαθέζοντο	*Lacedaemonii peregrinis sub umbra sedem assignabant in spectaculis, ipsique quovis loco sedebant.*
English from Greek: The Spartans, at their public spectacles, set seats for strangers in the shade; they themselves sat where they could.	English from Latin: The Lacedaemonians assigned a seat in the shade for strangers at public spectacles, while they themselves sat in any place whatsoever.

Language Differences: *The spatial detail ὑπὸ τῇ σκιᾷ translates cleanly as sub umbra.*

Commentary: One sentence, one civic gesture, preserved without comment in the notebook: the hosts take the sun so the guests may have the shade. Among the quotation-sections that close Book XI, this is the image of unostentatious fellowship — courtesy as self-discipline, exercised where no one is forced to notice it.

Book XI · Section 25

Repaying Benefits

Greek Original	Latin (Xylander 1558)
Τῷ Περδίκκᾳ ὁ Σωκράτης περὶ τοῦ μὴ ἔρχεσθαι παὰ αὐτόν˙ “ἵνα, ἔφη, μὴ τῷ κακίστῳ ὀλέθρῳ ἀπόλωμα”, τουτέστι, μὴ εὖπαθὼν οὐ δυνηθῶ ἀντευποιῆσαι	*Socrates Perdiccae quaerenti cur non ad ipsum veniret, respondit: 'Ne turpissimo interitu peream' — hoc est, ne beneficio affectus id non possim compensare.*
English from Greek: Socrates, to Perdiccas, on why he would not come to his court: 'Lest I perish by the worst of deaths' — that is, lest I receive favors and be unable to return them.	English from Latin: Socrates, to Perdiccas asking why he would not come to him, replied: 'Lest I perish by the most shameful death'—that is, lest having been treated with a benefit, I should be unable to compensate for it.

Language Differences: *The strong Greek τῷ κακίστῳ ὀλέθρῳ becomes turpissimo interitu.*

Commentary: Socrates declines a king's hospitality and names dependence the worst of deaths. The point Marcus preserves is the inversion of the usual ledger: not receiving too little, but receiving what one cannot repay, is the ruin — for it converts a free man into a debtor and friendship into patronage.

Book XI · Section 26

The Ephesian Practice

Greek Original	Latin (Xylander 1558)
Ἐν τοῖς τῶν Ἐπικουρείων γράμμασι παράγγελμα ἔκειτο συνεχῶςὑπομιμνήσκεσθαι τῶν παλαιῶν τινος τῶν ἀρετῇ χρησαμένων	*In Ephesiorum litteris erat hoc praeceptum, quod iubebat quotidie reminisci alicuius ex antiquis qui virtutem coluissent.*
English from Greek: In the writings of the Epicureans there stood a precept: to remind oneself continually of one of the men of old who practiced virtue.	English from Latin: In the writings of the Ephesians there was this precept, which commanded to remember daily someone from the ancients who had cultivated virtue. Scholarly Note: Xylander writes

	"Ephesiorum" (of the Ephesians) due to an early text variant or editorial slip; the standard text refers to the Epicureans (Ἐπικουρείων). This is a classical textual error of the 16th century.

Language Differences: *Xylander writes In Ephesiorum litteris due to an early text variant or editorial slip; the standard text refers to the Epicureans (Ἐπικουρείων). This is a classic 16th-century textual error.*

Commentary: Mental models of virtue are essential. Keeping a specific virtuous person from history in mind acts as a constant check on one's own behavior.

Book XI · Section 27

Morning Stars

Greek Original	Latin (Xylander 1558)
Οἱ Πυθαγόρειοι˙ ἕωθεν εἰς τὸν οὐρανὸν ἀφορᾶν, ἵν ὑπομιμνῃσκώμεθα τῶν ἀεὶ κατὰ τὰ αὐτὰ καὶ ὡσαύτως τὸ ἑαυτῶν ἔργονδιανυόντων καὶ τῆς τάξεως καὶ τῆς καθαρότητος καὶ τῆςγυμνότητος˙ οὐδὲν γὰρ προκάλυμμα ἄστρου	*Pythagorei mane nos caelum aspicere iubebant, ut recordaremur eorum qui semper suum officium praestant: item ordinis, puritatis, & simplicitatis nudae: astris enim nullum est velamentum.*
English from Greek: The Pythagoreans: at dawn, look up to the sky — that we may be reminded of those bodies that forever accomplish their work in the same way and after the same fashion; and of their order, and purity, and nakedness. For a star wears no veil.	English from Latin: The Pythagoreans commanded us to look at the sky in the morning, so that we might remember those things which always perform their duty: likewise of order, purity, and naked simplicity: for stars have no covering.

Language Differences: *Marcus's γυμνότητος maps precisely to simplicitatis nudae.*

Commentary: Look at the stars at dawn to remind yourself of cosmic order, consistency, and 'unveiled' purity. Stars have no 'clothing' (reputation or body) to hide their essence.

Book XI · Section 28

Socrates in the Sheepskin

Greek Original	Latin (Xylander 1558)
Οἷος ὁ Σωκράτης τὸ κώδιον ὑπεζωσμένος, ὅτε ἡ Ξανθίππηλαβοῦσα τὸ ἱμάτιον ἔξω προῆλθεν˙ καὶ ἃ εἶπεν ὁ Σωκράτης τοῖςἑταίροις αἰδεσθεῖσι καὶ ἀναχωρήσασιν, ὅτε αὐτὸν εἶδον οὕτωςἐσταλμένον	*Memento qualis fuerit Socrates cum pellem praecingeret, cum Xanthippe veste sumpta processit: ac quae dixerit sociis Socrates pudore affectis ac recedentibus, cum viderent eum in isto ornatu.*
English from Greek: Think of Socrates with the sheepskin girded round him, when Xanthippe had taken his cloak and gone out — and what Socrates said to his companions when they drew back in embarrassment at seeing him dressed so.	English from Latin: Remember what sort of man Socrates was when he girded himself with a hide, when Xanthippe, having taken his cloak, went out: and what Socrates said to his companions who were affected with shame and drew back when they saw him in that attire.

Language Differences: *The raw κώδιον maps directly to Xylander's pellem.*

Commentary: When his wife took his good clothes, Socrates went out in a sheepskin. He was entirely indifferent to his appearance, showing that the mind is the only thing that requires 'clothing' (virtue).

Book XI · Section 29

Student Before Master

Greek Original	Latin (Xylander 1558)
Ἐν τῷ γράφειν καὶ ἀναγινώσκειν οὐ πρότερον ἄρξεις πρὶνἀρχθῇς. τοῦτο πολλῷ μᾶλλον ἐν τῷ βίῳ	*Nunquam scribere & legere alios docebis, nisi ipse prius didiceris: id multo magis in vita est praestandum.*
English from Greek: In writing and reading you will not give rules before you have first been ruled. Much more so in life.	English from Latin: You will never teach others to write and read unless you yourself have first learned: this must be performed much more so in life.

Language Differences: *οὐ πρότερον ἄρξεις πρὶν ἀρχθῇς becomes nisi ipse prius didiceris.*

Commentary: Mastery requires prior submission to the rules of the craft. In life, you cannot master yourself until you submit to the rules of Reason.

Book XI · Section 30

Born a Slave

Greek Original	Latin (Xylander 1558)
Δοῦλος πέφυκας, οὐ μέτεστί σοι λόγου	*Servus es: non est tibi loquendi ius.*
English from Greek: 'You are a slave born; speech is not for you.'	English from Latin: You are a slave: you have no right of speaking.

Language Differences: *οὐ μέτεστί σοι λόγου becomes non est tibi loquendi ius.*

Commentary: A verse fragment copied without source — a slave silenced in some lost play. That an emperor kept the line for himself gives it its force: addressed inward, it indicts every moment the ruling part of the soul submits to passion and forfeits its voice.

Book XI · Section 31

The Heart's Laughter

Greek Original	Latin (Xylander 1558)
Ἐμὸν δ ἐγέλασσε φίλον κῆρ	*Tum vero charum cor mihi risum sustulit.*
English from Greek: 'And my dear heart laughed within me.'	English from Latin: Then indeed my dear heart burst into laughter.

Language Differences: *Homer's Odyssey IX quote is accurately mapped as charum cor.*

Commentary: Homer's line represents the internal resilience of the wise man, whose heart can laugh within even amid danger.

Book XI · Section 32

Attacking Virtue

Greek Original	Latin (Xylander 1558)
Μέμψονται δ ἀρετὴν χαλεποῖς βάζοντες ἔπεσσιν	*Virtuti gravibus facient convicia, urbis.*
English from Greek: 'And they will blame virtue, taunting her with harsh words.'	English from Latin: They will reproach virtue with heavy words, out of the cities. Scholarly Note: The word "urbis" (likely a corruption or distinct reading for words/taunts) is rendered here literally as relating to cities or city-dwellers, creating a distinct variant from the standard Greek fragment.

Language Differences: *Xylander prints urbis (cities) instead of matching Hesiod's original description of the taunts.*

Commentary: Hesiod's prophecy of the iron age, set down without gloss. Marcus needs only the one line: the blaming of virtue is an old phenomenon with a pedigree, foretold by the poets — so its appearance in one's own time should occasion neither surprise nor discouragement.

Book XI · Section 33

Figs in Winter

Greek Original	Latin (Xylander 1558)
Σῦκον χειμῶνος ζητεῖν μαινομένου˙ τοιοῦτος ὁ [τὸ] παιδίονζητῶν, ὅτε οὐκέτι δίδοται	*Insani est ficus hieme quaerere: tale est pueritiam quaerere praeteritam.*
English from Greek: To look for a fig in winter is a madman's act; such is he who looks for his child when it is no longer given.	English from Latin: It is the mark of a madman to look for figs in winter: such it is to look for a past childhood. Scholarly Note: Xylander interprets "child" (παιδίον) from Epictetus' quote as "childhood" (pueritiam), an abstract conceptual translation.

Language Differences: *Xylander interprets παιδίον (child) as pueritiam (childhood).*

Commentary: Seeking what is out of season — like a dead child or a lost youth — is a sign of a mind that has forgotten the laws of nature.

Book XI · Section 34

Kissing with Mortality

Greek Original	Latin (Xylander 1558)
Καταφιλοῦντα τὸ παιδίον δεῖν, ἔλεγεν ὁ Ἐπίκτητος, ἔνδονἐπιφθέγγεσθαι˙ “αὔριον ἴσως ἀποθανῇ.” - “δύσφημα ταῦτα.” -“οὐδὲν δύσφημον”, ἔφη, “φυσικοῦ τινος ἔργου σημαντικόν˙ ἠκαὶ τὸ τοὺς στάχυας θερισθῆναι δύσφημον	*Epictetus, puerum osculatus, interius cum eo se collocutum dixit: 'Fortasse cras mortem obibis.' 'Abominaris hoc.' 'Nihil dictu grave est,' inquit, 'quod aliquod opus naturae designat: aut grave erit si abominere id quod spicae metuntur.'*
English from Greek: Epictetus said that as	English from Latin: Epictetus, having

a man kisses his little child, he should say within: 'Tomorrow, perhaps, you will die.' 'But those are words of ill omen!' 'No word is ill-omened,' he said, 'that signifies a work of nature. Or is it ill-omened to speak of ears of grain being reaped?'	kissed his boy, said that he spoke within himself: 'Perhaps tomorrow you will meet death.' 'You find this an ill omen.' 'Nothing is grave in the saying,' he said, 'which designates any work of nature: otherwise it will be grave if you find it an ill omen that ears of grain are reaped.'

Language Differences: *The phrase δύσφημα ταῦτα is rendered as Abominaris hoc.*

Commentary: Loving something while acknowledging its mortality is true Stoic love. It is not an 'evil omen' but a statement of physical fact, no more ominous than speaking of grain being reaped.

Book XI · Section 35

The Cycle of the Grape

Greek Original	Latin (Xylander 1558)
Ὄμφαξ, σταφυλή, σταφίς, πάντα μεταβολαί, οὐκ εἰς τὸ μὴ ὄν,ἀλλὰ εἰς τὸ νῦν μὴ ὄν	*Uva primum cruda, deinde matura fit, post passa: haec omnia rei sunt mutationes, non in nihilum, sed in id quod iam non est.*
English from Greek: The unripe grape, the ripe cluster, the raisin: all changes — not into not-being, but into not-being-now.	English from Latin: The grape is first raw, then it becomes ripe, afterwards a raisin: all these are changes of a thing, not into nothingness, but into that which it is not now.

Language Differences: *The physical sequence Ὄμφαξ, σταφυλή, σταφίς is precisely matched as Uva primum cruda, deinde matura fit, post passa.*

Commentary: Death is not destruction, but a change from one state of being to another, like a grape turning into a raisin — not into nothing, but into what it is not now.

Book XI · Section 36

Invincible Choice

Greek Original	Latin (Xylander 1558)
Ληστὴς προαιρέσεως οὐ γίνεται˙ τὸ τοῦ Ἐπικτήτου	*Nemo (ut dicebat Epictetus) latro est voluntatis.*

English from Greek: 'No one can rob us of our choice' — the saying of Epictetus.	English from Latin: No one (as Epictetus used to say) is a robber of the choice.

Language Differences: *Λῃστὴς προαιρέσεως maps to latro est voluntatis.*

Commentary: External force can take your body or property, but never your internal 'Yes' or 'No' — no one can rob you of your choice.

Book XI · Section 37

Three Disciplines

Greek Original	Latin (Xylander 1558)
“Τέχνην”, ἔφη, “δεῖ περὶ τὸ συγκατατίθεσθαι εὑρεῖν καὶ ἐν τῷπερὶ τὰς ὁρμὰς τόπῳ τὸ προσεκτικὸν φυλάσσειν, ἵνα μεθὑπεξαιρέσεως ‹ὦσιν,› ἵνα κοινωνικαί, ἵνα κατ ἀξίαν, καὶ ὀρέξεωςμὲν παντάπασιν ἀπέχεσθαι, ἐκκλίσει δὲ πρὸς μηδὲν τῶν οὐκ ἐφήμῖν χρῆσθαι	*Ars autem, ait idem, invenienda est in assentiendo; utque impetus animi serventur, ita ut habeat adiunctam exceptionem, spectet societatem & dignitatem. Cupiditate omnino abstinendum est, neque inclinandum ad ea quae non sunt penes nos.*
English from Greek: He said: 'One must find an art of assent; and in the sphere of the impulses, keep close watch that they be with reservation, that they be social, that they be according to worth; and abstain wholly from desire, and use aversion toward nothing that is not in our power.'	English from Latin: Moreover, the same man says, an art must be found in assenting; and that the impulses of the mind must be preserved so that it possesses an attached reservation, respects society and worth. One must abstain entirely from desire, nor incline toward those things which are not within our power.

Language Differences: *The phrase μεθ’ ὑπεξαιρέσεως maps precisely to adiunctam exceptionem.*

Commentary: Training must operate in three areas: controlling assent (avoiding error), controlling impulse (acting for society with reservation), and controlling desire (aligning with fate, never reaching for what is not in our power).

Book XI · Section 38

Sanity vs. Madness

Greek Original	Latin (Xylander 1558)

“Οὐ περὶ τοῦ τυχόντος οὖν”, ἔφη, “ἐστὶν ὁ ἀγών, ἀλλὰ περὶτοῦ μαίνεσθαι ἢ μή	*Itaque, inquit, non de levi re sed de insania certatur — ita Socrates dixit.*
English from Greek: 'The contest, then,' he said, 'is not over any common matter, but over being mad or not.'	English from Latin: Therefore, he says, the contest is not over a trivial matter, but over madness—so Socrates said.

Language Differences: *οὐ περὶ τοῦ τυχόντος becomes non de levi re.*

Commentary: The choice to follow philosophy is not a trivial lifestyle choice; it is the contest between sanity and madness.

Book XI · Section 39

Socrates and the Souls

Greek Original	Latin (Xylander 1558)
Ὁ Σωκράτης ἔλεγεν˙ “τί θέλετε; λογικῶν ψυχὰς ἔχειν ἢ ἀλόγων;”“λογικῶν.” “τίνων λογικῶν; ὑγιῶν ἢ φαύλων;” “ὑγιῶν.” “τί οὖνοὐ ζητεῖτε;” “ὅτι ἔχομεν.” “τί οὖν μάχεσθε καὶ διαφέρεσθε	*'Vultisne compotes rationis animos habere, an non?' 'Volumus.' 'Cuiusmodi, bonosne an pravos?' 'Sanos.' 'Cur ergo non quaeritis?' 'Quia habemus.' 'Quid igitur contenditis?'*
English from Greek: Socrates used to say: 'What do you want? To have the souls of rational beings or of irrational?' 'Of rational.' 'Of what kind of rational — sound or worthless?' 'Sound.' 'Then why do you not seek them?' 'Because we have them.' 'Then why do you fight and quarrel?'	English from Latin: 'Do you wish to have minds master of reason, or not?' 'We wish it.' 'Of what kind, good or bad?' 'Sound ones.' 'Why then do you not seek them?' 'Because we have them.' 'Why then do you quarrel?'

Language Differences: *Xylander tracks this dialogue perfectly, rendering ὑγιῶν exactly as Sanos.*

Commentary: Socrates exposes human delusion: people claim they have 'healthy, rational souls' yet live in constant conflict. Conflict is the diagnostic proof of a diseased mind.

Glossary

Greek terms, Stoic vocabulary, and notes on the Roman world

TO MYSELF

The Meditations of Marcus Aurelius

Stuart Schonwetter Edition

Classic Motivation

About this Glossary

Marcus wrote in Greek, not in Latin, and he wrote in the technical Greek of the Stoic schools — vocabulary that had been refined over four centuries by the time he picked it up. A handful of words do most of the work. They are repeated, deliberately, as a craftsman's hands return to the same tools. Translating them flattens out the music. Leaving them un-translated requires a key. This is the key.

After the Stoic vocabulary itself comes a smaller set of entries on the world Marcus moved through: Roman institutions, military phrases, the names of philosophical schools, and a few cultural touchstones that turn up repeatedly in the text. Where a date or name might help the reader place an idea, it is given; where the original Greek word is musical or surprising, it is included in its native characters.

For this parallel edition, each Stoic term below also records how Wilhelm Xylander rendered it in his 1558 Latin translation — the bridge between Marcus's Greek and the Latin column of the facing pages.

Stoic Vocabulary

ἡγεμονικόν *(hēgemonikón)*

The ruling part. Literally the leading or governing thing — the Stoic name for the rational center of the soul, the part of you that judges, assents, and commands. Marcus returns to it constantly. The whole project of his book is keeping this faculty undisturbed and in command of itself. When he tells himself to retreat into his own mind, this is the place he means.

Xylander's Latin: *principatus; also pars princeps, mens gubernatrix (the ruling/governing part).*

λόγος *(lógos)*

A famously elastic word. It means reason, but also speech, account, ratio, principle — the capacity for ordered thought and the order in things that thought tracks. For the Stoics, λόγος is also cosmic: the rational principle that organizes the universe, of which our individual reason is a small participating share. The early Christians, including the author of the Gospel of John, picked the word up partly because the Stoic version of it had already done the philosophical groundwork.

Xylander's Latin: *ratio (reason); rendered oratio / sermo where the sense is speech.*

προαίρεσις *(proaírēsis)*

Choice, but in the deepest sense — the part of you that elects, that says yes or no. Aristotle had used the word; Epictetus made it central. Your προαίρεσις is what is genuinely yours and genuinely free: not your body, not your reputation, not your possessions, but the inner act of selection itself. The Stoic claim is that no tyrant can touch this. Whether that is comforting or grim is up to the reader.

Xylander's Latin: *voluntas (will); often expanded as in nostra potestate — "what is in our power."*

αἰδώς *(aidṓs)*

Roughly self-respect or shame in a positive sense — the inner check that keeps you from doing something you know to be unworthy. It is one of the older Greek virtues, with a religious dimension. Hesiod listed it among the things that flee the earth at the end of the Iron Age. Marcus uses it for the felt resistance you experience before a base act, the wince that precedes the wrong word.

Xylander's Latin: *verecundia; also pudor (modesty, self-respect).*

οἰκείωσις *(oikeíōsis)*

Affiliation, kinship, recognizing-as-one's-own. A foundational Stoic concept. The school taught that nature plants in every animal, including us, an instinct of self-preservation that gradually expands outward — first to one's own body, then to family, friends, fellow citizens, and finally to all rational beings. The cosmopolitan ethics of the Stoics rest on this idea. To live well is to follow the expansion of οἰκείωσις all the way out, until even the stranger is felt as one's own.

Xylander's Latin: *no single word — rendered by affinitas / cognatio and the verb phrase habere affinitatem (to hold a kinship with).*

φαντασία *(phantasía)*

Impression, appearance, the way something strikes us. Not yet a judgment — just the raw perception. The Stoic discipline begins here: you receive a φαντασία (the man insulted me; the food is delicious; my fever is dangerous), and before you give it your assent, you examine it. Most of Stoic

ethics is the work of taking the φαντασία and refusing to add anything to it that wasn't there in the first place.

Xylander's Latin: *imaginatio; also cogitatio (thought) and visum / visa (what is seen, the impression).*

ὑπόληψις *(hypólēpsis)*
Opinion, supposition, what you take a thing to be. The judgment laid down on top of the φαντασία. "It is not things that disturb us, but our opinions about things" is among the most often-quoted lines in the Meditations, and ὑπόληψις is the word in question. Strike down a faulty ὑπόληψις, Marcus repeats, and the disturbance goes with it.

Xylander's Latin: *opinio; sometimes iudicium (judgment).*

συγκατάθεσις *(synkatáthesis)*
Assent. The act of agreeing with an impression, of saying yes, this is so. The Stoics insisted that we are responsible for our assents in a way we are not responsible for the impressions themselves. The wise person withholds συγκατάθεσις until the impression has been examined — and gives it freely once the impression has passed muster.

Xylander's Latin: *assensio (assent).*

ἀπάθεια *(apátheia)*
Often translated as freedom from passion, which makes it sound colder than it should. ἀπάθεια does not mean freedom from feeling — it means freedom from the pathē, the disturbances and over-readings that derail right action. A Stoic feels grief, fear, joy. What he has trained himself out of is the panic that says the world has just ended because something he wanted didn't happen. Apatheia is closer to composure than to numbness.

Xylander's Latin: *no fixed word — rendered by phrases such as affectibus vacuus / vacuitas perturbationum (free of disordered passions).*

εὐδαιμονία *(eudaimonía)*
Happiness, but in the Greek sense — flourishing, living well, the life that goes well as a whole. Literally good-spirited (from the εὐ- prefix and δαίμων, see below). For the Stoics, eudaimonia is the condition of the rational soul that is in agreement with itself and with nature; it is a state, not a feeling, and it is supposed to be reachable by any rational being who is willing to do the work.

Xylander's Latin: *felicitas (happiness, good fortune; cf. felix for εὔμοιρος).*

ἀρετή *(aretḗ)*
Excellence, virtue. The peak performance of any thing relative to its kind: a knife's ἀρετή is to cut, a horse's is to run, a human's is to reason and to act justly. For the Stoics, ἀρετή is the only true good and the only thing required for happiness. Health, money, status — all preferable, all useful, all loseable. Virtue alone, they argued, is what nobody and nothing can take away.

Xylander's Latin: *virtus.*

πρόνοια *(prónoia)*
Providence, foresight. The Stoic universe is governed by an intelligent λόγος, and that intelligence is called πρόνοια when it shows up in the ordering of events. Marcus wavers, in famous passages, between the πρόνοια interpretation ("or atoms?") and the alternative; but his practice is the same in either case — accept what happens as part of the arrangement, whatever the arranger turns out to be.

Xylander's Latin: *providentia.*

φύσις *(phýsis)*
Nature. Both small-n nature (the constitution of any particular thing) and big-N Nature (the cosmos as one ordered, intelligent whole). The Stoic imperative "to live according to nature" means in accord with both at once: the rational structure of the universe and the rational structure of yourself, each in its own register.

Xylander's Latin: *natura.*

κόσμος *(kósmos)*
World, ordered whole, cosmos. The universe seen as a single organized intelligent system. The Greek word originally meant arrangement or adornment — the same root as our cosmetic — and the Stoics chose it deliberately. The world is a beautiful arrangement, not a chaos. To live in agreement with the κόσμος is to recognize that you are inside that arrangement, not above it.

Xylander's Latin: *mundus; also universum (the ordered whole).*

δαίμων *(daímōn)*
Spirit, guardian, divine portion within. Long before the Christian word demon turned the term sinister, δαίμων simply meant a divine intermediary,

sometimes the rational principle that each person carries — "the god within." Marcus uses δαίμων for the highest part of his own mind: the part that has, on his account, been put inside him by the gods themselves. To go against your δαίμων is to go against the gift.

Xylander's Latin: *genius (the guardian spirit / divine portion within).*

πνεῦμα *(pneûma)*
Breath, spirit. In ordinary Greek, πνεῦμα is the breath you take. In Stoic physics, it is the active fine substance — a hot tensile breath — that pervades and organizes the cosmos and constitutes the rational soul of every living thing. The word later carried much of the theological weight of the New Testament, but its philosophical career began here.

Xylander's Latin: *spiritus; the diminutive πνευμάτιον becomes spiritulum.*

εἱμαρμένη *(heimarménē)*
Fate. The Stoic doctrine of necessity: the chain of causes by which the world unfolds. εἱμαρμένη is not blind luck and it is not a malevolent will. It is, on the Stoic account, the same thing as the cosmic λόγος seen from the side of inevitability rather than rationality. To consent to εἱμαρμένη is to assent to the order of things; to fight it is to demand that the universe rearrange itself for you, which it will not.

Xylander's Latin: *fatum (destiny, the chain of causes).*

ἀπροπτωσία *(aproptōsía)*
Non-rashness. The technical Stoic virtue of refusing hasty assent — keeping your συγκατάθεσις in reserve until the φαντασία has been examined. It is the discipline of the careful judge: not skepticism, just patience. Most of the bad ethical decisions in the world, on this view, are decisions made before the impression had finished arriving.

Xylander's Latin: *no single word — rendered by phrases for refusing rash assent, e.g. ne temere assentiri (not to assent hastily).*

μεταβολή *(metabolḗ)*
Change, transformation. The universe for Marcus is ceaseless μεταβολή. Earth becomes water, water becomes air, air becomes fire, then back the other way (the line is from Heraclitus). To fight change is to fight the very condition of being alive. To love change is to love being part of the world rather than a guest in it.

Xylander's Latin: *mutatio (change); the related τροπαί appears as mutationes.*

καθῆκον *(kathêkon)*
Appropriate action; duty in its specific, contextual sense. Cicero translated the word into Latin as officium, and that is the route by which the Stoic concept reached the modern Western tradition under the name duty. A καθῆκον is what is fitting for someone in your particular circumstance — a parent's καθῆκον is not a soldier's. Marcus uses the word less often than Epictetus, but his book is, on every page, a working out of his own.

Xylander's Latin: *officium (Cicero's own rendering — appropriate action, duty).*

ἀδιάφορα *(adiáphora)*
Indifferent things. The Stoics divided the world into three categories: virtue (the only good), vice (the only evil), and everything else (the indifferents). Money, health, reputation, even life and death are ἀδιάφορα — preferable or dispreferable but not, properly speaking, good or bad. The category is the source of half the misunderstandings of Stoicism. The Stoics do not say these things don't matter; they say they don't make you good or bad. There is a difference.

Xylander's Latin: *indifferentia; rendered res mediae and res neque bonae neque malae (things neither good nor bad).*

ψυχή *(psychḗ)*
Soul. For the Stoics, the soul is material — a portion of πνεῦμα, the cosmic breath — but it is the part of us that thinks, feels, and chooses. After death the Stoics differed on whether the soul persisted briefly, scattered immediately, or was reabsorbed at the next cosmic conflagration. Marcus is comfortable not knowing.

Xylander's Latin: *anima; the diminutive ψυχάριον becomes animula.*

ὁρμή *(hormḗ)*
Impulse, the movement toward action. The Stoic action sequence runs: φαντασία (impression) → συγκατάθεσις (assent) → ὁρμή (impulse) → πρᾶξις (action). The impulse is what carries the agreement into the body. To control your ὁρμή is to keep the engine of action coupled to the steering of judgment.

Xylander's Latin: *impetus; also appetitio / appetitus (the movement toward action).*

The Roman World

Princeps *(first citizen)*
The official self-description of the emperor. Augustus, the first emperor, deliberately avoided the title king and used princeps instead — first among equals, in theory. By Marcus's day the pretense was thin, but the language survived; an emperor who took the language seriously, as Marcus did, treated the senate as a deliberative body and not as decoration. He still held all the power. He just declined to act like it.

Caesar / Augustus *(imperial titles)*
Caesar, originally the family name of Julius Caesar, became a hereditary title for the emperor. Augustus, originally an honorific granted to Octavian by the senate in 27 BCE, became the title of the senior emperor when there was more than one. Marcus and Lucius were both Augusti. The pair of titles eventually outlasted the empire — Caesar surviving in Russian Czar and German Kaiser, Augustus in the month of August, which Marcus and his subjects, every year, simply called August.

Senatus *(the senate)*
By Marcus's time the Roman senate had been, for two centuries, an aristocratic body whose powers were almost entirely advisory. The emperor controlled the army, the treasury, and the law. But a good emperor, on the late-Republican script that Marcus admired, treated the senate with conspicuous respect — attended its sessions, took its votes seriously, called its members friends. Marcus did all of this. It was part of the performance, but it was also, in his case, sincere.

Consul *(chief magistrate)*
Originally the highest elected office of the Roman Republic, held in pairs for one-year terms. By the imperial period the consulship was largely ceremonial, but it remained the great prize of a senatorial career. Marcus's grandfather had been consul three times, which by then required imperial favor as well as merit. The dignity of the title is hard to overstate; the actual job was light.

Stoa Poikile *(the Painted Porch)*
A colonnade in the agora of Athens, decorated with murals by the great fifth-century painter Polygnotus. Zeno of Citium taught his philosophy there

around 300 BCE, and his school took its name from the location: οἱ ἀπὸ τῆς στοᾶς, the men of the Stoa. Five centuries later a Roman emperor, on the Danube frontier, was still working out the implications of what some Athenians had said in front of a wall painting.

Lyceum, Academy *(Aristotle, Plato)*
The two other great philosophical schools of the Greek world. The Academy was Plato's school, founded around 387 BCE; the Lyceum was Aristotle's, founded about a generation later. The names refer to their original neighborhoods in Athens. By Marcus's day both schools had had their late-classical and Hellenistic heydays and were quieter institutions, but both still produced teachers whose work crossed Marcus's desk. Sextus, on his mother's side, was Plutarchian — a member of the late Platonist tradition.

Carnuntum *(Roman frontier city)*
A legionary base on the Danube, in what is now Austria near the Slovakian border, where Marcus spent long stretches of the Marcomannic Wars. Several books of the Meditations are believed, on internal evidence, to have been written there or in nearby camps. The site has been excavated; visitors can still walk among the foundations of the buildings inside which a Roman emperor scribbled to himself in Greek about how not to be angry.

Vindobona *(modern Vienna)*
Another Danube fortress, downriver from Carnuntum. Marcus died there in 180 CE, in winter quarters, probably of plague. The site is now buried under central Vienna; an inscription marks the approximate place of his death, although the scholarship is uncertain. He is one of the few Roman emperors whose final days were not spent in a palace or a battlefield camp but in a working frontier garrison — a fact that suits him.

Antonine Plague *(pandemic)*
An epidemic, almost certainly smallpox, that arrived in Rome with the legions returning from the Parthian war in 165 CE and recurred for the next fifteen years. Modern estimates put its mortality at five to ten percent of the empire's population, with much higher rates in the legions and the cities. The plague defines the second half of Marcus's reign; many of the Meditations passages on death and the sweeping-away of the things human beings care about read very differently against the backdrop of a pandemic

that almost certainly killed Lucius Verus and that Marcus himself probably died of.

Marcomannic Wars *(Danube frontier wars)*
A long, exhausting series of campaigns against Germanic and Sarmatian tribes pressing across the Danube — the Marcomanni, Quadi, Iazyges, and others — that occupied Marcus from about 166 CE until his death. The wars were inconclusive in the harshest sense: Marcus held the line, but the line had to keep being held, year after year, in winter quarters along a frozen river. The famous "Rain Miracle" — a sudden storm that saved a beleaguered legion — comes from this war, and is depicted on the column of Marcus Aurelius that still stands in Rome.

Pater Familias *(head of household)*
The senior male of a Roman household — by law, the holder of patria potestas, fatherly power, which extended in theory to life and death over wife, children, and slaves. By Marcus's time the harsher applications of the doctrine were obsolete, but the cultural authority remained. The Roman ideal pater familias was firm, fair, hardworking, and slow to anger — a description that doubled, in Marcus's hands, as the description of a good emperor. The household was the model for the state, and the state for the cosmos.

Toga praetexta, toga virilis *(the rites of growing up)*
The toga praetexta, edged with a purple stripe, was worn by senatorial-class boys until around age fifteen, at which point they exchanged it ceremonially for the plain toga virilis — the toga of manhood — and were enrolled as adult citizens. The change of toga was a household event with religious and legal weight. Marcus would have made it around 136 CE, two years before Hadrian's adoption arrangement turned his life over.

A Closing Note

No glossary can carry an author's whole vocabulary; this one is an aid to reading, not a substitute for it. Where a Greek term recurs in the Meditations and the reader senses that something is being meant more precisely than the English suggests, look here first. And where a word is missing from this list — there are several — take it as an invitation to look

up the next layer for yourself. Marcus, of all readers, would approve of the habit.